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I. Project Overview 
 
A. Freedom of Information in a Developing Nation 
  
Ghana, a nation of 25 million in West Africa,1 is fiercely proud of its political history. 
The first Sub-Saharan African nation to achieve independence from colonialism, Ghana has 
been a constitutional democracy since 1992.2 Since that time, there have been six 
presidential and parliamentary elections, with two peaceful transitions of power from one 
party to another.3 The 1992 Constitution creates a democratic political system and protects 
a litany of personal liberties and freedoms, including freedom of speech, religion, assembly, 
and press.4 
Not only is Ghana one of Africa’s most stable democracies, it also has one of the 
continent’s most successful economies. GDP growth routinely eclipses that of other African 
nations.5 Worldwide, Ghana is renowned for its cocoa and gold exports,6 and its economic 
growth has been aided by the recent discovery of oil.7 Indeed, “Ghana has been lauded 
internationally by the IMF and the World Bank as a ‘flagship’ of success.”8 
Still, developmental problems remain. While per capita income is roughly $400-
$450 per year,9 80 percent of Ghana’s population subsists on less than $1.00 a day.10 Forty-
                                                             
1 GHANA STATISTICAL SERV., POPULATION BY REGION, DISTRICT, LOCALITY OF RESIDENCE, AGE GROUPS AND SEX, 2010 (Oct. 
2010), available at http://www.statsghana.gov.gh/docfiles/population_by_region_district_locality_of_ 
residence_age_groups_and_sex,_2010.pdf. 
2 RACHEL NAYOR, GHANA: AN OXFAM COUNTRY PROFILE 18, 30 (2003). 
3 Peter Arthur, Democratic Consolidation in Ghana: The Role and Contribution of the Media, Civil Society and 
State Institutions, 48(2) COMMONWEALTH & COMPARATIVE POLITICS 203, 207–09 (April 2010). 
4 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA 1992, art. 21. 
5 Ghana Overview, THE WORLD BANK (April 2013), http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ghana/overview. 
6 NAYOR, supra note 2, at 6. 
7 Ghana: Oil Activity Rising, OXFORD BUSINESS GROUP (Feb. 13, 2013), 
http://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/economic_updates/ghana-oil-activity-rising; 
8 NAYOR, supra note 2, at 25. 
9 GHANA STATISTICAL SERV., GHANA LIVING STANDARDS SURVEY, REPORT OF THE FIFTH ROUND (GLSS 5) viii (Sept. 2008), 
available at http://www.statsghana.gov.gh/docfiles/glss5_report.pdf. 
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six percent of Ghanaians do not participate in the workforce.11 One third of all Ghanaians 
sleep under an insecticide-treated net to prevent malaria,12 and one fifth have no formal 
education.13 While 77 percent of men are literate, only 63 percent of women are.14 
Accusations of corruption, especially in regards to Ghana’s newfound oil wealth, are 
rampant.15 
Ghana’s continuing commitment to free speech and a free press plays a critical role 
in resolving these issues of poverty, resource allocation, healthcare, and educational 
opportunity. The freedom to acquire and share information is necessary both for 
democracy and for economic development. Media freedom enables journalists to serve as a 
watchdog against government corruption and relay important information to the 
electorate.16 Moreover, freedom of speech and economic development “expand[] the real 
freedoms that people enjoy,” and are thus part of the same path of progress for a 
developing nation.17 Fully realizing the freedom to acquire and share information is thus an 
essential part of the nation’s economic and political developmental goals. 
B. Class Objective and Overview 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
10 Id. at 105–06. 
11 Id. at 34. 
12 GHANA STATISTICAL SERV., 2008 GHANA DEMOGRAPHIC AND HEALTH SURVEY (GDHS): KEY FINDINGS 12 (2008), 
available at http://www.measuredhs.com/pubs/pdf/SR172/SR172.pdf. 
13 Id. at 2. 
14 Id. 
15 E.g., Laura Burke, Corruption, Oil Hot Issues in Ghana Election, VOICE OF AMERICA NEWS (Nov. 22, 2012), 
http://www.voanews.com/content/corruption-oil-hot-issues-in-ghana-election/1551149.html; Rawlings 
Accuses Mills of Stealing Oil Money, GHANA WEB (Apr. 18, 2011), 
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=207126; William Wallis et al., 
Corruption Probe into Sale of Ghana Oil Block, FINANCIAL TIMES (Jan. 7, 2010), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/28ed19fc-fbca-11de-9c29-00144feab49a.html#axzz2RhBXc3tE. 
16 See infra text accompanying notes 45–46.  
17 See infra text accompanying notes 52–55. 
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In January 2013, ten students18 and Professor Joseph Blocher from Duke University 
School of Law organized a seminar to study legal, political, and cultural issues relating to 
freedom of speech, the press, and other media in Ghana. The seminar was the fourth 
iteration of international seminars initiated by Professor Laurence R. Helfer, the co-
director of Duke Law School’s Center for International and Comparative Law and a member 
of the faculty steering committee of the Duke Center on Human Rights. Previous seminars 
had focused on property rights in Brazil, Israel, and Ghana. 
The seminar met weekly for two months in Durham, North Carolina, focusing on 
Ghanaian law, history, culture, politics, and the present state of press freedom and media 
proliferation in Ghana. Students analyzed the Ghanaian Constitution and proposed freedom 
of information and broadcasting laws, read firsthand accounts of journalists’ experiences in 
Ghana, followed Ghanaian news sources in their coverage of political and social 
developments, and discussed academic literature written by Ghanaian lawyers and 
scholars. Particular attention was placed on the relationship between the government and 
both state-owned and private media, media penetration into rural areas, and the use of 
media for development purposes.19 
The fieldwork portion of the seminar lasted ten days and included meetings in 
Accra, Cape Coast, Ada, and Dogo. Students met with various stakeholders with unique 
perspectives on press freedom in Ghana. This included journalists from state-owned and 
private media outlets, government representatives from the National Media Commission 
                                                             
18 The students were Jacob Charles, Colleen Healy, Christopher Jones, Ellie Marranzini, Jonathan Nussbaum, 
Lauren Ross, all of the Duke Law class of 2013, and Nick Brod, Nina Gupta, Hyatt Howard, and Ndidi Menkiti, 
all of the class of 2014. 
19 A full list of the works consulted by the seminar class before departing for Ghana is attached in Appendix II.  
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and Parliament, and lawyers and educators from the University of Ghana, the GIMPA Law 
School, and the Ghana School of Law.20 The Media Foundation for West Africa, headed by 
Kwame Karikari, served as the primary in-country partner.  
C. Purpose of Written Work 
 
This work product summarizes the findings of the Ghana seminar and analyzes 
current attempts to more fully realize media freedom in Ghana. Two attempts in particular, 
the proposed Right to Information Bill (RTI) and Broadcast Bill, are central to legal reform 
and media freedom, and thus receive extensive attention here. 
The analysis here is greatly informed by, and indeed would not be possible without, 
the insights shared by our partners and interviewees in Ghana. Their generosity and 
insights form the core of this Report. And while each of those partners is truly the expert in 
his or her field, our hope as disinterested outsiders is to synthesize their insights, offering 
an analysis that incorporates multiple points of view.  This Report was therefore written 
with our Ghanaian partners and interviewees in mind. The Report combines what we have 
learned from them, and from our own research. It offers a framework for conceptualizing 
how free speech and press advance democratic and economic development, analyzes 
recent legislative proposals for both accessing and disseminating information, and offers 
recommendations on how to more fully realize the freedoms of speech and press enshrined 
in the Ghanaian constitution. 
  
                                                             
20 A full list of the Ghanaian organizations and representatives met with is attached in Appendix I.  
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II. Summary of Findings 
 
This Report begins by showing that free speech and free press are crucial for a 
developing nation. In an immediate sense, both freedom of press and freedom of speech are 
guaranteed by the Ghanaian Constitution.21 More broadly, promoting freedom of press and 
of speech is an essential element of promoting democracy. The progress Ghana’s 
democracy has made since the 1992 Constitution can be attributed in part to freedom of 
speech and press, and those values can continue to safeguard the democratic process. 
Moreover, a free and robust press can root out the kind of government corruption that 
hinders national development.  
A detailed history of speech and media in Ghana both demonstrates the practical 
importance of these freedoms and sets the stage for current debates about how best to 
protect them. Many media outlets in Ghana, especially those owned by the state, predate 
the 1992 Constitution. These institutions now compete with a private press that has 
flourished since the country’s democratization. Legal reforms, including Article 162 of the 
Constitution, guarantee a free and independent media.22 Many restrictive pre-1992 media 
laws, including the criminal libel statute, survived the governmental transition but have 
since been repealed. Nonetheless, impediments such as laws that criminalize “causing fear 
and alarm” or “scandalizing the court” remain in place.23 
                                                             
21 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA 1992, arts. 21, 162. 
22 Id. art. 162. 
23 Interview with Nene Amegatcher, President, Ghana Bar Ass’n, in Accra, Ghana (Mar. 15, 2013). 
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Fully overcoming the residual legal impediments to free expression in Ghana means 
safeguarding the ability to acquire information and the freedom to share that information. 
Both are integral to the operation of a robust public sphere. Two proposed pieces of 
legislation, the Right to Information (RTI) Bill and the Broadcast Bill, seek to address these 
two components of media freedom.  
The RTI Bill is designed to implement the broad right to information promised in 
the Ghanaian Constitution,24 It creates a procedure for obtaining information from various 
government agencies and qualifies what types of information citizens are entitled to. 
However, in many ways the Bill falls short of securing the full freedom to information 
needed in Ghanaian society.  
                                                             
24 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA 1992, art. 21(1)(f). 
Residual Legal Impediments to Free Expression in Ghana 
This Report focuses on two major aspects of media freedom and free expression, but other troubling legal barriers 
remain:  
• First, the offense of scandalizing the court—which allows judges to hold their critics in criminal contempt—raises 
serious concerns about the constitutional right of citizens to question government officials. Though the contempt 
power itself is conferred by article 162(2) of the 1992 Constitution, the employment of this potent tool to silence 
critics in Republic v. Mensa Bonsu led one dissenting justice to wisely observe that in a democracy “courts must 
have regard to the right of every person to express himself freely and openly on all matters of public concern 
whether pertaining to the actions of the executive, the legislature or the judiciary.”  
• Second, section 208 of the Criminal Offences Act, which criminalizes false publications “likely to cause fear and 
alarm to the public or disturb the public peace,” predicates criminal liability on an unacceptably vague standard, 
which invites arbitrary enforcement and application.  
• Third, the law granting presidential access to state-owned media on demand leaves insufficient space for 
independent editorial decision-making and creates the appearance of government control and bias.  
• Fourth, and finally, the remaining civil libel laws—which have involved journalists in 90% of recent cases—risk 
chilling robust free speech unless they are sparingly employed and make ample provision for reasonable defenses 
by members of the media acting in good faith.   
10 
 
The proposals for a Broadcast Bill seek to regulate the national airwaves for both 
radio and television. In a country where most citizens get their news from radio,25 this is 
potentially a far-reaching piece of legislation. Yet the Bill fails to take into account many 
new developments in radio technology, leaving serious barriers for the free transmission of 
information by the Ghanaian media. 
This Report discusses these proposed pieces of legislation in turn. By analyzing their 
purposes, structures, and likely effects, the Report can illuminate current attempts to more 
fully realize media freedom within the broader context of democratic and economic 
development in Ghana. 
  
                                                             
25 Jonathan Temin & Daniel A. Smith, Media Matters: Evaluating the Role of the Media in Ghana’s 2000 
Elections, 101 AFRICAN AFFAIRS 585, 602 (2002). 
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III. Free Speech and Development: Contemporary and Historical Context 
 
A. The Role of Free Speech in Democratic and Economic Development 
 
In the words of Bright Blewu, President of the Ghana Journalists Association (GJA), 
press freedom is critical to the functioning of a democratic society because it “promote[s] 
free transmission of information” and “lend[s] a voice to the voiceless.”26 This statement 
captures the importance of a democratic right to both receive information and 
communicate that information.27 Key stakeholders representing state-owned, private, and 
community media outlets agree that robust individual and collective speech rights facilitate 
public participation28 and ensure government transparency and accountability.29 Yaw 
Boadu-Ayeboafoh, General Manager of Newspapers at the Daily Graphic, predicts that these 
democratic outcomes will help to create a Ghanaian society that is more respectful of 
human rights.30 
                                                             
26 Interview with Bright Blewu, President, Ghana Journalists Ass’n, in Accra, Ghana (Mar. 11, 2013). 
27 See Organization of African Unity, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“Banjul Charter”), art. 9, 
June 26, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5 [hereinafter Banjul Charter]. 
28 Interview with Wilna Quarmyne, Co-founder, Ghana Cmty. Radio Network, in Accra, Ghana (Mar. 11, 2013) 
(emphasizing the importance of public participation by marginalized communities because the “right to 
communicate” encompasses a right “to not just express your opinion but to have it taken into account”). 
29 Interview with Yaw Boadu-Ayeboafoh, Gen. Manager of Newspapers, Graphic Comm. Grp. Ltd., in Accra, 
Ghana (Mar. 12, 2013) (advocating for freedom of information legislation because it will (1) create an 
environment that is more open and transparent, (2) allow Ghanaians to challenge authorities openly in court, 
and (3) subject judicial action to public discussion); Interview with Gina Ama Blay, C.E.O., Western 
Publications, Ltd., in Accra, Ghana (Mar. 11, 2013) (explaining that the role of the private press is to ensure 
accountability and transparency of government by reporting from the independent perspective of one who is 
not “in bed with government”).  
30 Interview with Yaw Boadu-Ayeboafoh, supra note 29.  
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These stakeholders’ statements reflect a national commitment to free speech, free 
press, and other “participatory freedoms”31 enshrined in Ghana’s 1992 Constitution as well 
as numerous international human rights instruments and the constitutions of democratic 
nations throughout the world. Specifically, Article 21 of the Ghanaian Constitution provides 
for “freedom of speech and expression, which shall include freedom of the press and other 
media” as well as freedom of information.32 Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights states that “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression,” 
including freedom “to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media 
and regardless of frontiers.”33 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, of 
which Ghana is a signatory, protects a nearly identical right.34 In addition, the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the “Banjul Charter”) provides for an individual 
right to receive information and express and disseminate opinions.35 Ghana ratified the 
Banjul Charter in 1989 and signed it in 2004.36 
Free speech has long been recognized in Ghanaian society as “an inviolable 
fundamental human right that cannot be suppressed.”37 Traditional maxims depict speech 
as an instinct that cannot be suppressed without causing agony to the speaker.38 Though 
                                                             
31 The term “participatory freedoms” is used in this Report to refer to individual and collective freedoms that 
influence public discussion and social interactions, including freedom of speech, freedom of the press, 
freedom of expression, and freedom of information. See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 9 (1999). 
32 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA 1992, art. 21(1). 
33 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 19, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, 
UN Doc. A/810 (1948). 
34 International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights, art. 19, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter 
ICCPR]. 
35 Banjul Charter, supra note 27, art. 9. 
36 Ratification Table: African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, AFRICAN COMM’N ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ 
RIGHTS, http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/ratification (last visited Apr. 27, 2013). 
37 KWESI YANKAH, FREE SPEECH IN TRADITIONAL SOCIETY: THE CULTURAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMMUNICATION IN 
CONTEMPORARY GHANA 12 (1998). 
38 Id. at 13. 
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cultural norms and verbal taboos in traditional societies often dictated “the nature and 
style of communication in the face of authority,”39 other traditional practices, such as 
festivals of free speech, demonstrate “a highly cherished democratic ideal of free 
expression.”40 
Despite widespread recognition of the intrinsic value of participatory freedoms, 
however, it is frequently argued that civil and political rights are “luxuries” of democracy 
that cannot be supported until “the development process has borne enough fruit.”41 This 
argument prioritizes the national interest in economic development over individual 
political and civil liberties. When applied to speech and press freedom specifically, media 
becomes an instrument for development and a tool for government programs, rather than 
a critical watchdog.42 “Developmental journalism,” as it is frequently referred to in practice 
and in academic literature, promotes national unification and education rather than 
fostering public debate and discourse.43 It is a concept that seems to be particularly 
common in postcolonial developing nations.44  
This vision of the relationship between journalism and development is unduly 
narrow, robbing value from each. Sacrificing participatory freedoms in the name of 
development fails to give due regard to their intrinsic value. Moreover, this tradeoff 
                                                             
39 Id. at 25. 
40 Id. at 23. Festivals of free speech were “days on which social norms [were] frozen” and “the deeds of rulers 
and elders [were] brought into the open forum … and critically assessed in order to check the extent to which 
they promote[d] the people’s collective aspirations over the past year.” Id. at 20–21. 
41 SEN, supra note 31, at 35 (describing and criticizing this conception). 
42 See H. KWASI PREMPEH, GHANA CTR. FOR DEMOCRATIC DEV., CONST. REV. SERIES NO. 3, REFORMING THE CONSTITUTION 
OF GHANA FOR A NEW ERA: AVERTING THE PERIL OF A CONSTITUTION WITHOUT CONSTITUTIONALISM 4, 14–17 (2009) 
(describing threat of an “imperial presidency” in Ghana). 
43 JENNIFER HASTY, THE PRESS AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN GHANA 11 (2005). 
44 SEN, supra note 31, at 13–14.  
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underestimates both the instrumental role of participatory freedoms in promoting 
democracy and the role of democracy in promoting economic development.  
A robust media, which is dependent upon participatory freedoms, enhances 
democracy in at least three important ways. First, a 
robust media serves as a “watchdog on the 
government” by exposing official action to public 
scrutiny.45 In addition to increasing the likelihood that 
public corruption will be exposed, government 
awareness of the media’s watchful eye enhances 
transparency and discourages public corruption.46 
Second, media provides a platform for communication 
between a government and its constituents. This 
function is extremely important because “the majority 
[is] in the periphery when it comes to politics and 
democracy” while government officials “wield the power and form the core of society 
though they are in the minority.”47 Because democracy derives its authority and legitimacy 
from public participation,48 good governance requires bilateral communication between 
the majority and minority. The media serves this need by informing the government of the 
periphery’s needs and alerting the periphery of the government’s activities.49 Finally, 
public discussion of official action increases public officials’ accountability to their 
                                                             
45 Joe Brandford Nylnah, Democracy and the Journalist’s Role, in STATE OF THE MEDIA IN GHANA 40 (Freidrich 
Ebert Stiftung, ed. 1994). 
46 Id.  
47 Id. at 38–39. 
48 See SEN, supra note 31, at 31. 
49 Nylnah, supra note 45, at 38–39. 
Ghana in Context 
Ghana is one of the most stable and 
free countries in all of Africa, and 
particularly in West Africa. The 
Freedom House, a U.S.-based 
nonprofit, ranks countries annually 
based on the political rights and 
civil liberties that their citizens 
enjoy. In 2013, Ghana scored a one 
(the highest) of seven in the 
political-rights and a two in the 
civil-liberties category. Only 22% 
of Sub-Saharan African countries 
earned a “free” ranking on this 
index. In 2012, Ghana was one of 
only five Sub-Saharan African 
countries to earn a “free” ranking in 
press freedom. 
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constituents. The media’s ability to deliver accurate, unbiased, and complete information to 
the electorate both during and after elections determines voters’ ability to make informed 
choices.50 In Ghana, for example, commentators largely seem to agree that the media’s 
performance in this regard has improved with each election.51 
Perhaps more frequently underestimated is the role of democracy in promoting 
development. Many definitions of the term “development” focus narrowly on particular 
(and sometimes controversial) methods for enhancing substantive freedom such as 
industrialization, social modernization, or liberalization of markets.52 These definitions fail 
to recognize “the ends that make development important,” and instead focus on “the means 
that . . . play a prominent part in the process.”53 If attention is drawn to the goals of 
development rather than the means, development might be more broadly defined as “a 
process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy.”54 According to this definition, 
development is achieved through “removal of major sources of unfreedom: poverty as well 
as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation, neglect of 
public facilities as well as intolerance or inactivity of repressive states.”55 
Participatory freedoms are inextricable from the overall goal of expanding 
substantive freedoms for two main reasons. First, political and civil rights provide an 
opportunity for public expression of social and economic needs. Second, public discourse 
ensures that government is held accountable for equitable distribution of public resources.  
                                                             
50 Id. at 40. 
51 See, e.g., Interview with Audrey Gadzekpo, Sr. Lecturer, Sch. Comm., Univ. of Ghana, in Accra, Ghana (Mar. 
13, 2013); PREMPEH, supra note 42, at 1. 
52 See SEN, supra note 31, at 3.  
53 Id.  
54 Id. at 36. 
55 Id. at 3. 
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Public discussion is important to development because it shapes society’s 
understanding of needs, deprivations, and feasible solutions.56 Because the topics 
addressed by news media are both reflective and constitutive of social reality, 
marginalization from public debate significantly increases the likelihood that a particular 
group’s “unfreedoms” will be ignored.57 Participation in public debate, on the other hand, 
provides a platform for “constructive impatience” by which individuals and communities 
can demand official action on their behalf rather than being “passive recipients of the 
benefits of cunning development programs.”58 
                                                             
56 Amartya Sen, Democracy as a Universal Value, 10 J. DEMOCRACY 3, 11 (1999).  
57 HASTY, supra note 43, at 8. 
58 SEN, supra note 31, at 11.  
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Robust political and civil liberties are also essential to development because of their 
18 
 
key role in preventing the “resource curse” from undermining both democratic progress 
19 
 
and economic growth.59 The resource curse refers to “a political/institutional and not an 
                                                             
59 PREMPEH, supra note 42, at 5. 
20 
 
economic phenomenon” in which newfound wealth causes democracy to malfunction in the 
21 
 
absence of meaningful checks and balances on executive power.60 In response to this 
concern, Ghana’s Center for Democratic Development has advocated constitutional reforms 
that “redress the persistent deficit of constitutionalism, of a lack of credible and robust 
checks and balances, transparency and accountability in the working of government.”61 In 
contrast to the concept of democracy, which focuses on elections, “constitutionalism is 
concerned with regulating and disciplining the government’s exercise of its power . . . in the 
period between elections”62 and particularly with regard to “the use and distribution of 
public resources.”63 Meaningful oversight of official action is dependent upon free exercise 
of civil and political liberties and is critical to ensuring that economic development is not 
undermined by economic growth.  
                                                             
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 6–7. 
62 Id. at 2. 
63 Id. at 5. 
Ghana’s Oil Boom 
       In December 2010, Ghana began exporting oil and joined the ranks of Africa’s oil producers. Ghana’s sudden oil 
boom sprouted fears of a “resource curse.”  For example, Nigeria’s sudden production of oil has brought wealth to 
very few while causing conflict and corruption in society.  However, Ghana’s oil industry is regarded as one of the 
better-regulated oil industries in Africa. The Oxford Business Group reported in February 2013 that “the country is 
anxious to avoid the ‘resource curse’ that has affected other oil producers, and in recent years has invested 
considerable time establishing an appropriate regulatory framework.” For example, the Petroleum Commission Act of 
2011 in Ghana established an independent body to regulate the oil sector, and a committee monitors compliance with 
industry law. 
 
      Companies with licenses in the nation’s offshore territory include both national and foreign companies, which 
brings up fears of foreign encroachment.  Therefore, one of the government’s key goals has been encouraging 
domestic participation and boosting local content in the oil industry.   
 
Sources: 
1. Oxford Business Group, Ghana: Oil activity rising, Feb. 13, 2013, available at 
http://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/economic_updates/ghana-oil-activity-rising. 
 2. BBC News, The curse of Nigerian oil, Jan. 3, 2009, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/7808670.stm. 
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Ghana has made incredible progress in the areas of democracy and civil and political 
rights since 1992. The nation’s recent elections demonstrate the continuing vitality of 
democratic rule and the Ghanaian media. Nevertheless, there are “certain patterns and 
habits from the past,” including highly centralized power, significant unregulated 
discretion for the executive, and “rampant use of political patronage,”—problems of 
implementing constitutionalism—that have the potential to undermine Ghana’s economic 
and political development if not addressed.64 Given the essential role of participatory 
freedoms in increasing both the legitimacy and accountability of government, expanding 
participatory freedoms is one way in which Ghana can strengthen and prepare its 
flourishing democratic institutions to responsibly handle sudden oil wealth and other 
unforeseen changes. As intrinsically valuable human rights and essential elements of 
democracy and economic development, participatory freedoms must be a current priority 
for Ghana rather than being relegated to a time of economic wealth that may never 
materialize in their absence.  
B. Free Speech and Press in Ghana’s Development 
 
 Ghana’s relatively recent past demonstrates the importance of media freedom for 
both political and economic development. Ghana’s eighty years of colonial rule65 and thirty-
five years of post-independence non-democratic rule66 inform current proposals for reform 
in the areas of freedom of information and effective regulation of the broadcast media. 
                                                             
64 Id. at 2. 
65 Great Britain ruled Ghana as the Gold Coast Colony from 1876 to 1957. NAYLOR, supra note 2, at 15, 18. 
66 From 1957 to Ghana’s first democratic elections in December of 1992, Ghana was governed by a series of 
military regimes and largely unaccountable civilian governments. Id. at 19–30. 
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Many Ghanaians remember the years when the average citizen had no voice, a time in 
which there was neither the power of the ballot box nor the freedom to publicly express 
one’s views. During this time, the media served as a guard dog for the government rather 
than as a watchdog for the public. The government created and maintained this role for the 
media by instituting barriers to open speech and free media: it carefully monitored the 
press, interrogated and imprisoned journalists, and shut down private newspapers and 
radio stations.67 
Since freedom of speech and independence of the media were enshrined in Ghana’s 
1992 Constitution, these traditional barriers to speech and media rights have been largely 
removed. The press—both in traditional print and in newer forms—has flourished. The 
media is no longer limited to state-owned sources that function as the mouthpiece of the 
ruling political party. Instead, there are a variety of state-owned, community-based, and 
private newspapers and radio stations operating in Ghana. Reporters and individuals are 
largely free to openly express themselves. In fact, Ghana ranked third among African 
countries in the 2013 Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index, with a world-wide 
position in between the United Kingdom and United States.68 The Freedom House’s 2013 
“Freedom in the World” rankings indicated that Ghana is a “free” country, characterized by 
“open political competition, a climate of respect for civil liberties, significant independent 
civic life, and independent media.”69 
                                                             
67 For an account of one part of this period in Ghana’s history, see generally Yaw Twumasi, The Newspaper 
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This Section describes Ghana’s move from repression of speech and state control of 
the media to its contemporary embrace of free expression. This historical trajectory 
explains the current state of affairs and sets the context for the potential reforms discussed 
in later Sections of the Report. For although Ghana has fostered freedom of the media and 
individual speech over the past two decades, further reforms are necessary to realize 
complete and equal access to information and freedom of expression. 
1. Speech and the Media Before Democracy 
 
 Charles McCarthy, the British Governor of the Gold Coast colony, founded Ghana’s 
first newspaper, the Royal Gold Coast Gazette, in 1822.70 The paper, which catered to 
European merchants and administrators living in the colony, “served as an official organ of 
the British colonial administration.”71 Over a half century later, Ghanaians founded the first 
locally owned and operated paper in Accra.72 Multiple Christian groups began printing 
newspapers, some with columns in local languages, in the late nineteenth century.73 From 
the late 1800s through Ghana’s independence, the well-educated Ghanaian elite and 
Christian missionaries dominated the newspaper business.74 The British did not re-enter 
the Ghanaian newspaper market until the British-owned Mirror Group bought out a locally 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
create the rankings, the Freedom House evaluated countries on a scale of one to seven for political rights and 
civil liberties, with one as the best ranking and seven as the worst. Id. at 19. Ghana scored a one for political 
rights and a two for civil liberties. Id. at 15. For context, only 22 percent of Sub-Saharan African countries 
earned the Freedom House’s “free” ranking. Id. at 10. 
70 KWAME KARIKARI, PRESS, POWER & POLITICS: GHANA 8 (2003). 
71 Id. at 8; Kwadwo Anokwa, Press Performance Under Civilian and Military Regimes in Ghana: A Reassessment 
of Past and Present Knowledge, in PRESS FREEDOM AND COMMUNICATION IN AFRICA 9 (Festus Eribo & William Jong-
Ebot eds. 1997). 
72 Different sources cite different names for this initial publication. Compare KARIKARI, supra note 70, at 9 
(using the title The West African Herald), with CLEMENT E. ASANTE, THE PRESS IN GHANA: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 
1 (1996) (calling the paper The Accra Herald). 
73 KARIKARI, supra note 70, at 9. Some of these papers still exist today. Id. 
74 Id. at 10. 
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owned paper in 1950.75 Their Daily Graphic quickly began to threaten smaller, regional 
papers due to its superior funding and modern facilities.76 
Even in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the press had a “political 
and partisan character” as the local media attacked the colonial administration and its 
policies.77 The colonial government maintained press-restrictive laws, from newspaper 
registration ordinances to harsh criminal laws prohibiting seditious conduct by the press.78 
It often censored or suppressed the Ghanaian-owned newspapers, such as the Ashanti 
Pioneer, especially as the independence movement gained momentum in the 1950s.79 In 
addition to censorship of print media, the colonial administration established Ghana’s first 
radio station in 1935 with the purpose of serving the political and administrative goals of 
the British Empire.80 Because the media was initially founded as a state organ and then 
used for political purposes, this dual tradition—state ownership and media politicization—
has continued for much of Ghanaian history. 
Ghana gained independence from Great Britain in 1957; it was the first Sub-Saharan 
African country to do so.81 Its first leader, Kwame Nkrumah, was a former reporter who 
understood the power of the media.82 To Nkrumah, the media had a duty to support the 
government,83 because Ghana’s “independence was too important to be subjected to 
                                                             
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 10–11. 
78 ASANTE, supra note 72, at 3–4; Anokwa, supra note 71, at 9. 
79 KARIKARI, supra note 70, at 9. 
80 Amin Alhassan, Market Valorization in Broadcasting Policy in Ghana: Abandoning the Quest for Media 
Democratization, 27 MEDIA, CULTURE & SOC. 211, 211–12 (2005). 
81 KARIKARI, supra note 70, at 7. 
82 ASANTE, supra note 72, at 5–7 (“Nkrumah’s penchant for journalism and his desire to use the printed word 
to gain political leverage and recognition started long before his return to Ghana in 1947.”) 
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Western-style investigative reporting.”84 By 1962, Nkrumah had censored many 
independent newspapers.85 Laws such as the Preventative Detention Act allowed his 
government to detain newspaper editors (along with many others) without trial or charges 
and the Minister of Information was able to stop publications that conflicted with the 
government’s interests.86 When the government bought out the Daily Graphic and closed 
other papers, the de facto state monopoly on the media became official.87 
This state of media affairs continued through a number of military regimes and 
failed attempts at democracy between the coup d’état that ended the Nkrumah regime in 
1966 and the beginning of a true republican democracy in 1993.88 Between 1966 and 1981, 
Ghana alternated between military regimes and short-lived civilian governments.89 As the 
National Reconciliation Commission noted in 2004, the “history of media repression, co-
optation and resistance . . . [that] crystallized during [Nkrumah’s regime] . . . became an 
established pattern by successive regimes throughout the country’s history.”90 As a new 
regime shifted into power, it replaced newspaper editors.91 Often newspapers would self-
censor under the watchful eye of military regimes, without much direct interference from 
the government.92 For example, the media generally supported each new coup d’état as if 
                                                             
84 Id. 
85 KARIKARI, supra note 70, at 9. 
86 Id. at 9–11 
87 Id. at 11. The government also controlled the only radio station, the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation, 
during this period. Alhassan,  supra note 80, at  213–14. 
88 KARIKARI, supra note 70, at 11–12; Anokwa, supra note 71, at 5 (quoting General Ankrah, head of Ghana’s 
first military government, when speaking about state control of the media: “He who pays the piper calls the 
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89 Anokwa, supra note 71, at 6 
90 GHANA NATIONAL RECONCILIATION COMMISSION REPORT 135 (2004). 
91 Id. at 138. 
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there were a choice.93 Even regimes that declared intentions of preserving a private press 
soon reneged on their promises.94 
Ghana’s 1979 Constitution purported to protect freedom of speech in various ways—
proclaiming the right to free speech, prohibiting media licensing laws, ending press 
censorship, and establishing an independent press commission.95 These guarantees 
remained unrealized during the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) rule in the 
1980s and early 1990s. Licensing laws were reinstated and the state-owned media lost any 
semblance of independence from the government.96 The government controlled the state-
owned papers’ editorial boards and required the papers to portray the government in a 
positive light.97 More subtle means of controlling the press were also available, from 
reducing official advertising support or newsprint availability to rewarding “good” 
reporters with expensive gifts or lofty promotions.98 Given the restrictions of this period, 
“self-censorship was the rule in the media”99 and a “culture of silence” developed.100 
Meanwhile, the state-owned Ghana Broadcasting Corporation (GBC) held a monopoly on 
television and radio.101 
2. The Turning Point: Ghana’s 1992 Constitution 
  
As Ghanaians began to oppose the PNDC regime and clamor for a greater voice in 
government, Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings, the head of the PNDC government, 
                                                             
93 Id. at 139, 142, 157. 
94 Id. at 163. Because there was only state-owned radio to begin with, similar clamp-downs did not occur in 
the broadcast sector. Alhassan, supra note 80, at  215. 
95 LAVERLE BERRY, GHANA: A COUNTRY STUDY 223 (1994). 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 ASANTE, supra note 72, at 118–20. 
99 BERRY, supra note 95, at 223. 
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concluded that “transition to democracy was the only long-term option.”102 On January 7, 
1993, a new constitution ushered in Ghana’s Fourth Republic, the country’s fourth 
attempted democratic government.103 This document, drafted in 1992 and thus referred to 
as the 1992 Constitution, created a republican government consisting of a president, 
parliament, cabinet, Council of State, and an independent judiciary, each with divided 
powers to provide checks on the other departments.104 Chapter Five guarantees a host of 
fundamental human rights, including freedom of speech.105 Article 21(1) provides that 
“[a]ll persons shall have the right to (a) freedom of speech and expression, which shall 
include freedom of the press and other media. . . . [and] (e) information, subject to such 
qualifications and laws as are necessary in a democratic society.”106 Exceptions are allowed 
when they are “reasonably required for the purpose of safeguarding the people of Ghana 
against the teaching or propagation of a doctrine which exhibits or encourages disrespect 
for the nationhood of Ghana, the national symbols and emblems, or incites hatred against 
other members of the community.”107 
The freedom and independence of the media is reaffirmed later in Article 162 of the 
Constitution.108 The government is not allowed to interfere with the editors and publishers 
of newspapers by creating “impediments to the establishment of private press or media.”109 
Additionally, media outlets are required to publish rejoinders made by those who disagree 
with the media’s views and state-owned media must “afford fair opportunities and facilities 
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107 Id. art. 21(4)(e). 
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for the presentation of divergent views and dissenting opinions.”110 Again, exceptions can 
be made when “reasonably required in the interest of national security, public order, public 
morality and for the purpose of protecting the reputations, rights and freedoms of other 
persons.”111 
 The 1992 Constitution also provided for a National Media Commission (NMC), 
which was established by legislative enactment in 1993.112 The NMC is an eighteen-
member body with representatives appointed by the President, Parliament, industry 
groups such as the GJA and the Ghana Bar Association, and religious groups.113 Its goals are 
to ensure “the freedom and independence of the media,” to establish “the highest 
journalistic standards in the mass media,” to “insulate the state-owned media from 
governmental control,” and to create publication registration regulations.114 
3. Post-Constitutional Legal & Practical Developments 
 
In the two decades after the 1992 Constitution, democracy flourished in Ghana. In 
fact, as early as 1994, the reforms of the 1992 Constitution were taking effect: “the press 
ha[d] begun to enjoy a significant degree of toleration and freedom of expression.”115 
Despite resource obstacles, hundreds of media outlets in Ghana began to operate. In the 
first ten years of the Fourth Republic, Ghanaians founded over two hundred newspapers 
and magazines—many short-lived. Of the hundreds of publications, approximately three 
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dozen became stable newspapers.116 Although the state still owns some newspapers, these 
newspapers have editorial discretion—they are state-owned, rather than state-
controlled.117 Commercial radio stations, such as JOY FM, and community radio stations, 
such as Radio Ada, have also become mainstays of the Ghanaian media.118 Furthermore, the 
media has played the role that development scholars urged; one scholar has noted that “the 
media has been instrumental in safeguarding the country’s democratic principles by 
performing its watchdog and monitoring functions.”119 This has enabled Ghanaians “to 
participate more fully in public life.”120 
The Supreme Court played a key role in this transition by ensuring that several of 
the mandates of the 1992 Constitution came to fruition. On July 22, 1993, the Supreme 
Court announced three decisions in favor of the New Patriotic Party (NPP), a newly formed 
opposition party, including one decision in a media rights case.121 These cases collectively 
symbolized the independence of the judiciary from the executive;122 substantively, they 
involved important aspects of media freedom. In New Patriotic Party v. Ghana Broadcasting 
Corp.,123 the NPP challenged the coverage of the 1993 budget by the Ghana Broadcasting 
Corporation (GBC). After the Minister of Finance, Kwesi Botchwey, defended the budget for 
over two hours on radio and television, the NPP applied to the GBC to be given equal time 
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to voice its opinion on the budget.124 When the GBC refused the request, the NPP sued, 
citing articles 55(11) and 163 of the 1992 Constitution, which guarantee equal coverage for 
opposition political parties.125 The Supreme Court decided that the state-owned GBC was 
required to give the NPP “fair and equal access to its facilities within two weeks.”126 This 
meant that equal access had to be given to each political party by the state-owned media so 
that they could present their social, political, and economic platforms.127 The Court justified 
its decision in terms of Ghana’s budding democracy: 
The free exchange of views is necessary to give the electorate 
an opportunity to assess the performance of the government in 
power against the potential of an opposition in the wilderness. 
It keeps the government on its toes and gives the neutral, 
apolitical citizen an opportunity to make up his mind. . . . In a 
truly democratic environment, this testing ground is sine qua 
non to the survival of a free pluralistic society.128 
 
The Supreme Court also played a key role in allocating power between the government and 
the NMC, which had come into early conflict with the ruling government—an unsurprising 
development given Ghana’s long history of state control of the media.129 The Court upheld 
the NMC’s right to appoint the chief editors of the state-owned media.130 However, in a 
separate case, the Court maintained executive control over the distribution of radio 
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frequencies to broadcasters.131 After the government shut down an independent station in 
1994, the station’s owner sued, citing article 162(3) of the 1992 Constitution which 
prohibits licensing laws.132 At the time, the Radio Frequency Control Board (RFCB),133 
controlled by the executive, allocated frequencies.134 In Republic v. Independent Media 
Corporation of Ghana,135 the Supreme Court held that the regulation of radio frequencies 
was permissible under the 1992 Constitution’s exceptions to safeguard national security 
and public order.136 
Even after the Court ironed out these constitutional difficulties, the media still faced 
legal constraints, as many pre-1992 laws remained on the books. For example, between 
1993 and 1996, there were sixty-eight court cases brought against journalists; by 1999, 
120 court cases had been filed against the private press, most of them initiated by the 
government and the ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC) party.137 Often, these 
cases led to hefty monetary damages or even jail time;138 the simple threat of such lawsuits 
created an atmosphere that stifled journalistic freedom, despite the theoretical 
constitutional guarantees. In both print and radio, self-censorship remained the norm 
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during much of the 1990s, partially out of subtle government pressure and partially out of 
habit.139 
Tensions increased as the 2000 elections drew near. That year, police arrested a 
publisher and editor of the Ghanaian Chronicle and an editor of The Independent.140 A 1999 
Freedom House report on global press freedom listed Ghana’s press as being “not free” 
because the ruling government arrested journalists, shut down opposition radio stations 
during election season, and initiated criminal libel suits against reporters who spoke out.141 
In the most famous such case, Republic v. Tommy Thompson Books Ltd and Others,142 the 
Supreme Court upheld the criminal libel law as constitutional, citing the fact that article 
164 subjects the freedom of the press to reasonable limitations.143 The newly-elected NPP 
government finally repealed criminal punishments for defamation in 2001.144 This 
development has been “celebrated as being pivotal in the harmonization of pre-1993 
received laws and the Constitution.”145 The consequences of the repeal were so important 
that Professor Ernest Kofi Abotsi has declared that it “prompted an explosion in the media 
landscape,” especially for radio.146 The end of criminal-libel liability provided significant 
relief for journalists, though other legal barriers remain: reporters are still subject to civil 
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libel lawsuits, judicially imposed contempt of court,147 and criminal punishment for 
incitement of public fear.148 
4. Second Generation Rights 
 
Both democracy and constitutionalism in Ghana have come a long way since the 
nation’s 1957 independence. Indeed, the media has achieved almost full independence 
from government control. To date, Ghana has held five successful elections—in 1992, 1996, 
2000, 2008, and 2012—and witnessed peaceful transfers of political power in 2000 and 
2008.149 The media has played an instrumental role in the country’s democratic elections 
and transitions.150 Even so, Ghana is still striving to make further improvements to its 
constitutional system. For example, from 2010 to 2011, a Constitutional Review 
Commission closely examined the 1992 Constitution and recommended amendments to 
better implement the Constitution’s overarching goals.151 The Constitutional Review 
Commission’s report on the media recognized that “these are indeed the best of times for 
the media,” but that “there are a number of challenges that militate against the lofty goals 
the Constitution seeks to achieve.”152 
Now that the media’s basic independence and efficacy have been established, a 
second generation of reforms may begin to take shape. “Second generation” reforms will 
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allow Ghana to more fully realize the virtues of free speech as a human right and a tool of 
development. Going beyond formal independence of the press, second generation reforms 
must focus on continuing areas of concern: resource allocation, training and professional 
development of journalists, access to government information, and a regulatory scheme 
that ensures media’s substantive independence while also ensuring accountability. Ghana 
is well on its way to implementing these kind of second-generation reforms. To promote a 
more robust public sphere, one that respects the rights of citizens to both receive and share 
information—to hear and to be heard—two pieces of legislation have been introduced: the 
Right to Information Bill and the Broadcasting Bill. These proposed legal reforms attempt 
to translate free-speech values into public policy and are thus important vehicles for 
achieving the twin aims of democratic participation and economic development.  
Sections IV and V of this Report analyze these legislative proposals for accessing and 
sharing information in turn. Each Section begins by exploring the theoretical 
underpinnings of the two proposals, discussing why they matter and how such reforms fit 
into broader international trends regarding the regulation of speech and information. Each 
Section then considers the obstacles Ghana faces to fully implementing such legislation, and 
finally, each Section concludes by offering some suggested solutions to the problems 
identified.  
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IV. Access to Information 
 
A. The Importance of the Right to Access Information 
 
 Absent the ability to access details about the government and its dealings—how it 
spends its money, how it enforces its laws, or how it regulates its economy—political, legal, 
and economic life would be shrouded in mystery. In such an information-less world, 
citizens searching for answers about their government would confront nothing but silence; 
journalists, nothing but evasive answers or closed doors. Corruption, bribery, and abuse 
would run free, unimpeded by the people who—without information—would have no 
power to check the powerful themselves. 
Perhaps American Founding Father James Madison had this nightmarish scenario in 
mind when he famously remarked, “[a] popular government, without popular information 
or the means of acquiring it is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy; or, perhaps both. 
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own 
governors must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.”153 Speaking some 
170 years later, it was the thought of a world without a right to information that led then-
U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan (himself a Ghanaian) to characterize information access 
as both “central to democracy”154 and a “condition[] for [economic] development.”155 
 International law surrounding the right to information has developed with these 
considerations in mind. In 1946, the first session of the United Nations General Assembly 
passed a resolution voicing support for a right to information, declaring, “[f]reedom of 
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information is a fundamental human right and is the touchstone of all the freedoms to 
which the United Nations is consecrated.”156 Two years later, the General Assembly 
enshrined the right to “seek, receive and impart information and ideas” in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.157 Emphasizing its importance, the Special Rapporteur 
subsequently clarified this provision in an annual report to the United Nations Commission 
on Human Rights: 
[T]he right to seek and receive information is not simply a converse of the 
right to freedom of opinion and expression but a freedom on its own. . . . 
[T]he right to seek, receive and impart information imposes a positive 
obligation on States to ensure access to information, particularly with regard 
to information held by the Government . . . .”158  
 
This approach to information access has rapidly expanded into other international 
legal contexts. In fact, since its enumeration in the Declaration of Human Rights, the right to 
information has grown seemingly ubiquitous, especially of late. It has been codified in 
many international legal documents, including the United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption,159 the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,160 and the Aarhus 
Covenant.161 Regional international bodies have also protected the right to information, 
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Imprisonment, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/40 11, 14 (Jan. 28, 1998), available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/7599319f02ece82dc12566080045b296?Opendocument 
(emphasis added).  
159 United Nations Convention Against Corruption, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41, art. 13 (Oct. 31, 2003) (directing member 
states to provide the public with effective access to information). 
160 The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, U.N. Doc.A/CONF.151/26 10 (Aug. 12, 1992) (instructing member states to provide access to 
information regarding environmental issues). 
161 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters, 2161 U.N.T.S. 447, art. 3 (Oct. 30, 2001) (same). 
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protections that can be found in the legal provisions of such diverse associations as the 
Council of Europe, the European Union, the African Union, the Southern African 
Development Community, the Organization of American States, the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, the Commonwealth of Nations, and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States.162 Indeed, the right to information has become so 
popular that at least eighty-six countries have passed some form of freedom of information 
legislation, with another thirty-five countries contemplating pending statutes.163 
Ghana numbers among those thirty-five. Since 2003, Ghana has considered passing 
a Right to Information Bill that would operationalize the guarantee provided in its 
Constitution protecting the right to access information.164 Despite having a constitutional 
provision on point, statutory reform is necessary to turn this abstract information right 
into a concrete reality for everyday Ghanaians. This task raises challenging questions about 
the relationship between the individual and the state, the virtues and the limits of 
transparency, and the framework needed to successfully implement what international law 
regards as a fundamental human right. To address these questions, this Section considers 
why a right to information matters in the first place. It then turns to how that right might 
be put into practice by drawing on the experiences of other countries that have 
implemented freedom of information legislation.   
                                                             
162 A detailed discussion of these regional international bodies and their many treaties is beyond the scope of 
this paper. For a more complete discussion, see David Banisar, Freedom of Information Around the World 
2006: A Global Survey of Access to Government Information Laws, PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL (2006), available 
athttp://www.freedominfo.org/documents/global_survey2006.pdf.  
163 Roger Vleugels, Overview of all FOIA Countries, STATEWATCH (Sept. 22, 2008), available at 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2008/sep/foi-overview-86-countries-sep-2008.pdf.  
164 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA 1992, art.21(f) (“All persons shall have the right to information, 
subject to such qualifications and laws as are necessary in a democratic society.”). 
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1. Why Does The Right To Information Matter? 
 
 Legal scholars have long contemplated why a right to information is important, both 
as a matter of constitutional and statutory law. Drawing from these rationales, this Section 
offers a framework for conceptualizing the reasons for a right to information.165 Some of 
these rationales relate to democratic development; they explain the value of the 
information right in the context of broad notions about politics, legitimacy, and human 
dignity. Others relate to economic development; they provide on-the-ground justifications 
for how robust legal protections surrounding information access can reduce corruption, 
preserve private property rights, and improve public health.166 
a. Democratic Development 
 
 Access to information allows the public to participate in the democratic decision-
making process. While such informed participation can facilitate better public policy that is 
more in tune with the needs of the people, it is also an end in and of itself; “democracy, 
after all, is not about the people necessarily being right, but about the right of the people to 
be wrong.”167 For citizens to exercise the right afforded to them under a democratic system 
to control their government, “[c]itizens [must] be fully informed and able to participate as 
                                                             
165 This framework and the rationales it contains are adapted from the insights of several free speech and 
administrative law scholars who have considered the value of information access. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, 
“The First Amendment is an Information Policy,” http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2213465 (Feb. 7, 2013); Frederick Schauer, Transparency in Three Dimensions, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1339 (2011); Roy Peled & Yoram Rabin, The Constitutional Right to Information, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
357 (2011); John M. Ackerman & Irma E. Sandoval-Ballesteros, The Global Explosion of Freedom of 
Information Laws, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 85 (2006). 
166 Such categorizations should not be taken for more than they are worth. To be sure, democratic 
development and economic development are mutually reinforcing processes, and factors influencing one may 
very well influence the other. The aim here is simply to develop an analytical framework for thinking about 
why a right to information matters. To that end, the distinction between democratic and economic 
development is helpful, but that is not to suggest that those aims are somehow mutually exclusive—they are 
decidedly not.  
167 Schauer, supra note 165, at 1349. 
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democratic citizens,”168 a condition that is only possible “if they are able to access 
information held about them and on their behalf by the government.”169 In this way, a right 
to information is an “initial condition”170 for citizen participation in the democratic process. 
Fundamental procedural political rights such as freedom of expression and the right to vote 
are rendered meaningless if the people remain ignorant of the internal workings of their 
government.171  
Because access to information is a precondition for the exercise of other rights 
fundamental to the democratic process, it has the potential to strengthen relationships 
between individuals and between the individual and the state. More information 
encourages vibrant political debate among citizens, thereby increasing levels of social 
capital and facilitating social functioning. Possession of information access also suggests a 
duty, as a condition of citizenship, of the people to actively monitor the conduct of their 
government and to participate in politics.172 A right to information thus lays the 
groundwork for a civic revival, one where participation in politics is not just a right but also 
a responsibility.   
In this way, more information in the hands of the public allows citizens to actively 
hold their government accountable. Knowledge is power, and freedom of information laws 
put authority back in the hands of the people. Because governments know that citizens can 
monitor their operations, freedom of information laws deter bad behavior in the form of 
                                                             
168 Ackerman & Sandoval-Ballesteros, supra note 165, at 92. 
169 Id. 
170 Peled & Rabin, supra note 165, at 360. 
171 Id. at 361 (“The ability of individuals, interest groups, and organizations to actively participate in political 
debates deciding issues on the public agenda, as well as the very possibility of placing issues on that agenda, 
is tightly linked to their ability to obtain relevant information.”). 
172 Ackerman & Sandoval-Ballesteros, supra note 165, at 90. 
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secrecy, corruption, bribery, and regulatory capture.173 For example, freedom of 
information statutes have played an instrumental role in revealing information about past 
human rights abuses, political scandals, and presidential secrecy.174 It should come as little 
surprise, then, that of the twenty least corrupt countries in the world,175 eighteen have 
implemented statutory rights to information. 
 Table 1: 20 Least Corrupt Countries and Freedom of Information Laws 
 
Country Freedom of information 
law? 
Country Freedom of information 
law? 
1. New Zealand   Yes 
(1982) 
11. Luxembourg   Yes 
(1978) 
2. Denmark  Yes 
(1970) 
12. Hong Kong  Yes 
(1995) 
3. Finland  Yes 
(1951) 
13. Iceland   Yes 
(1969) 
4. Sweden   Yes 
(1766) 
14. Germany   Yes 
(2005) 
5. Singapore  No 
(--) 
15. Japan   Yes 
(1999) 
6. Norway  Yes 
(1970) 
16. Austria   Yes 
(1987) 
7. Netherlands   Yes 
(1978) 
17. Barbados   No 
(--) 
8. Australia   Yes 
(1982) 
18. United Kingdom  Yes 
(2000) 
9. Switzerland   Yes 
(2004) 
19. Belgium   Yes 
(1994) 
10. Canada   Yes 
(1982) 
20. Ireland   Yes 
(1997) 
 
The ability of citizens to engage in administrative oversight that accompanies the 
passage of freedom of information statutes encourages public officials to make their 
                                                             
173 Schauer, supra note 165, at 1349; see also LOUIS BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKER’S USE 
IT 92 (1913) (“Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial disease. Sunlight is said to 
be the best of disinfectants . . . .”). 
174 ARTICLE 19: GLOBAL CAMPAIGN FOR FREE EXPRESSION, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION TRAINING MANUAL FOR PUBLIC 
OFFICIALS 13–15 (2006), available at http://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/tools/foitrainersmanual.pdf. 
175 For a complete set of data on worldwide levels of corruption, see 2013 INDEX OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM, 
http://www.heritage.org/index/book/chapter-2.  
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decision-making processes more transparent. Citizen access and input into government 
policymaking can start an ongoing conversation between the government and the 
governed, one that in the long run allows politicians and civil servants to better respond to 
the needs of the people. Increased transparency on the part of government and increased 
participation in government can improve the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of the 
people, even when the government makes policy choices with which some individuals 
disagree. As such, a right to information can spark beneficial exchanges between the 
government and its citizens and can have concrete, practical effects on political stability by 
ensuring mutual respect and understanding between those with the information and those 
requesting it.176 
 Additionally, freedom of information can facilitate the search for truth. Access to 
information “inclines toward knowledge . . . even if it does not guarantee it.”177 More 
information is preferable to less information because it leaves decisions about what is true 
and what is false in the hands of the people, decisions to be made on their own terms and 
free from government interference.178 Individuals must serve as the ultimate arbiters of 
truth, not the government “which will always attempt to impose an orthodoxy consonant 
with the frequently corrupt interests of the bureaucracy.”179 As such, a right to information 
preserves autonomy and free choice—central features of any democratic regime—by 
allowing individuals to make informed decisions for themselves, decisions that, without 
                                                             
176 Ackerman & Sandoval-Ballesteros, supra note 165, at 92. 
177 Schauer, supra note 165, at 1350. 
178 See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he best test of truth 
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . .”). 
179 Nicholas Wolfson, Free Speech and Hateful Words, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1991). 
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access to information, can never truly be free.180 A right to information thus demonstrates 
deep respect for human dignity by enabling free thought and by preserving the right of an 
individual to choose her own way, to find her own truth.  
b. Economic Development 
 
 i. Decreased corruption. Reductions in corruption that flow from increased access to 
information can fuel economic development by attracting foreign direct investment, 
encouraging entrepreneurship, incentivizing innovation, and promoting fair 
competition.181 As such, free information can complement the free market by reducing 
transaction costs and fostering a more reliable, stable investment climate.182 
 The relationship between economic development and freedom from corruption is 
especially stark in Sub-Saharan African countries. As Figure 1 demonstrates, there exists a 
strong, positive correlation between increases in freedom from corruption and increases in 
per capita gross domestic product. This relationship holds when analyzed globally as 
well.183 Ghana’s freedom from corruption score is a full ten points higher than the mean 
freedom from corruption score in Sub-Saharan Africa,184 but progress can still be made. For 
example, Ghana’s freedom from corruption score is slightly below the worldwide 
average,185 and Ghana ranks as the world’s seventy-first least corrupt country.186 A right to 
                                                             
180 Schauer, supra note 165, at 1350 (describing a right to information as “a necessary pathway on the road to 
truth”).  
181 Edwin J. Feulner, The Rule of Law, 2013 INDEX OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM (2013), 
http://www.heritage.org/index/book/chapter-2 (demonstrating the link between economic growth and low 
levels of corruption).  
182 Daniel Kaufmann & Tara Vishwanath, Toward Transparency: New Approaches and Their Applications to 
Financial Markets, 16 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 41, 41–57 (2001) (highlighting the relationship between 
economic development and access to information). 
183 Feulner, supra note 181. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
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information bill could help change this dynamic by increasing public oversight of 
government, reducing corruption, and, ultimately, increasing economic growth.  
Studies have demonstrated, for example, that freedom of information statutes can 
help corporations better assess the potential location of factories or headquarters, make 
bids for government contracts, and adapt to future legal and regulatory changes, all 
conditions that have the potential to spur both foreign direct investment and grassroots 
entrepreneurial growth.187 On the other hand, a lack of transparency can impede economic 
growth by creating conditions that permit poor government accounting procedures and 
that allow private officials to pocket money that would otherwise be used to fund public 
projects, such as infrastructure improvements, public health initiatives, or construction of 
new schools. Angola’s lack of freedom of information legislation, for example, played a role 
in permitting five years’ worth of oil revenue—$8.45 billion—to disappear into private 
hands.188 
ii. Property rights. A right to information can also serve important property interests. 
Ownership and control of information is vested in the state acting for the public as a whole. 
But information held by public authorities is ultimately the property of a state’s citizens; 
after all, it was created and compiled by civil servants “considered to be public trustees 
who carry out their mandate by means of taxes paid [by] the public.”189 Thus, the owners of 
the information—those who financed its creation—have a proprietary stake in their ability 
to access that information, which was produced to serve a public purpose. A right to 
                                                             
187 WORLD BANK INITIATIVE, COMPANIES AND THE RIGHT TO ACCESS PUBLIC INFORMATION 5 (Apr. 26, 2007), available at 
http://www.accessinitiative.org/sites/default/files/Companies%20and%20the%20Right%20to%20Access
%20Public%20Information.pdf. 
188 COLIN DARCH & PETER G. UNDERWOOD, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD 222 (2010). 
189 Peled & Rabin, supra note 165, at 365. 
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information safeguards these property interests by ensuring that government officials, in 
their capacity as public trustees, do not step outside the terms that determine the 
trusteeship by artificially restricting access to information that is not theirs in the first 
place.190 
Access to information also safeguards important interests in real property. A title 
registration system that provides a reliable record of land rights increases protection for 
landowners from arbitrary government takings and facilitates conveyances and other 
transactions.191 Transparent documentation of ownership rights in a system accessible to 
the average landowner is an especially pressing problem for West African countries where 
only two to three percent of land is held by written title,192 despite the fact that West 
African economies rely heavily on agricultural and natural resource production.193 While 
such a system must be carefully tailored to align with traditional customary institutions 
that have long regulated property rights,194 access to information about land ownership 
through a reliable and transparent title registration system could go a long way toward 
strengthening property rights for average citizens.    
                                                             
190 Id. at 366 (“The proprietary justification treats damage to the individual’s right to information as if it were, 
in effect, damage to the individual citizen’s property rights.”). 
191 See, e.g., Steven E. Hendrix, Myths of Property Rights, 12 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. LAW 183 (1995). 
192 Camila Toulmin, Securing Land and Property Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Role of Local Institutions, 
INT’L INST. FOR ENV’T & DEV. 27, 34 (2006), available at http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/G00460.pdf.  
193 Id. at 29. 
194 Id. at 28–29. See also Joseph Blocher, Note, Building on Custom: Land Tenure Policy and Economic 
Development in Ghana, 9 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 166 (2006).  
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iii. Public health. Increased access to information can improve the health of citizens by 
improving public awareness about the nature and the risks of communicable diseases. For 
example, some scholars have attributed the rapid spread of HIV in Africa and the severity 
of the SARS outbreak in China to the failure of governments to provide the public with 
timely information about such diseases, their causes, their consequences, and their 
treatment.195 Economist Amartya Sen has argued that media access to information is 
central to preventing famines because the media has the ability to hold politicians 
accountable by raising awareness about an emerging food crisis.196 This theory holds 
particular salience in light of India’s experience with its Right to Information Act, which 
was recently used to expose government officials who stole over four million kilograms of 
                                                             
195 DARCH & UNDERWOOD, supra note 188, at 23.  
196 SEN, supra note 31, at 51–52.  
Property, Information, and the Salt Flats 
     Since “time immemorial,” the Songor lagoon and salt flats have been an important source of livelihood for people in 
the Ada communities.1 Traditionally, salt was treated as a communal resource both in and beyond the Ada 
communities; salt collectors “travelled from far and wide to the Songor without being turned away.”2  Beginning with 
colonization and continuing into contemporary times, however, the Ada community has struggled to defend communal 
access to the salt flats from both government appropriation and commercialization.3  
     Radio Ada has served a critical role in mobilizing the community to collectively defend their access to this 
important natural resource. In addition to disseminating information to the community about attempts to privatize the 
salt flats, participatory radio programs have created a platform for pluralistic and intergenerational discussion that has 
ensured that local leaders are responsive to the community’s needs.4 “[R]ooted in the ongoing collective defense of 
community-felt needs,” Radio Ada is an excellent example of the role that community radio can play in allowing 
marginalized groups to “challenge not only the material reality but also the epistemic logic of neoliberal globalized 
resource alienation” and other development projects that are inconsistent with local needs and values.5  
  
1
 Ato Kobbie, Salt: Ada Wants Community-Friendly Law… as They Reject Alternative Livelihood, BUSINESS ANALYST, Dec. 3 2012, 
available at http://www.ghanabusinessanalyst.com/index.php/trade-industry/item/208-salt-ada-wants-community-friendly-law-as-
they-reject-alternative-livelihood.  
2Jonathan Langdon, Contesting Globalization in Ghana: Communal Resource Defense and Social Movement Learning, 2 J. ALT. 
PERSP. SOC. SCI. 309, 319 (2010). 
3Id. at 318. 
4Id. at 331–33. 
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rice intended for distribution to the poor.197 And freedom of information statutes can 
improve public health by increasing public access to environmental data, including sources 
of pollution and environmental impact statements.198 
2. Limits on the Right to Information 
 
 This does not mean that the right to information has no limits. Right to information 
statutes around the world contain exemptions to protect individual privacy, national 
security, and trade secrets, among others.199 That said, access to information serves 
important aims, and right to information legislation must be carefully drafted so as not to 
impose limits that contravene the pragmatic and theoretical rationales outlined above. To 
better illuminate the nature of these challenges, this Section provides a comparative 
analysis of right to information statutes.   
3. Who Should Give What To Whom? Central Features of Right to Information Statutes  
  
While Ghana has a constitutional provision ensuring a right to information, such a 
provision can be difficult to translate into practice without appropriate enforcement 
legislation. Crafting such legislation requires those involved to answer the fundamental 
question confronting any freedom of information law: who should give what to whom? 
In evaluating the efficacy of the current Freedom of Information Bill before 
Parliament, it may be helpful for legal scholars, politicians, journalists, and everyday 
citizens alike to have a sense of the common features freedom of information statutes share 
and the way they have been implemented in other countries across the globe. 
                                                             
197 Alasdair Roberts, India’s Right to Information Act: The First Four Years, FREEDOMINFO (Jan. 13, 2010), 
http://www.freedominfo.org/2010/01/indias-right-to-information-act-the-first-four-years/. 
198 DARCH & UNDERWOOD, supra note 188, at 24. 
199 See generally Banisar, supra note 162. 
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 Scholars have outlined nine central features shared by the majority of freedom of 
information statutes. These are listed in Table 2. A comparative analysis of freedom of 
information regimes can be found in Appendix III. 
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Table 2. Features of Free Information Regimes200 
 
Principle Description 
1. Maximum disclosure a. Freedom of information laws presume access 
b. The mandate to provide information extends to all elected 
bodies as well as private bodies that carry out public functions 
c. Information includes records regardless of the form in which 
they are stored 
2. Obligation to publish a. Public bodies should disseminate key information even in the 
absence of a request 
b. New technologies makes it easier to disseminate more 
information at less cost 
c. Routine disclosure will minimize the need for individuals to 
request access  
3. Promotion of open 
government  
a. Public culture must recognize the need for information as a 
fundamental human right 
b. Steps must be taken to inform citizens about the right to 
information, why it matters, and how it can be invoked 
c. Those who willfully obstruct access to information should face 
legal repercussions  
4. Limited scope of 
exceptions 
a. Limits on access to information should be carefully 
circumscribed 
b. Exceptions should protect overriding public and private 
interests, including privacy 
c. Exceptions should apply only where there is risk of substantial 
harm to the potential interest and that harm is greater than the 
public interest in having the information 
5. Processes to facilitate 
access 
a. Requests for information should be processed rapidly  
b. Reasons should be articulated for a denial of access to 
information 
c. Independent review of a denial should be available  
6. Costs a. Fees should not deter citizens from making requests  
b. Fees should not exceed the costs incurred to produce the 
information 
c. The public should be on notice of such fees and they should be 
levied fairly and consistently across requests  
7. Open meetings a. Meetings of public bodies should be open to the public to the 
fullest extent possible  
8. Disclosure takes 
precedence  
a. Laws inconsistent with the presumption of disclosure should be 
repealed or overridden by freedom of information statutes  
9. Protection for 
whistleblowers  
a. Individuals who release information on government 
wrongdoing should be protected from retaliatory action 
                                                             
200 Information compiled from TONY MENDEL, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL SURVEY 31–40 (2d 
ed. 2008);ARTICLE 19: GLOBAL CAMPAIGN FOR FREE EXPRESSION, supra note 174. 
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B. Obstacles to Accessing Information 
 
 Ghana’s robust constitutional media protections have resulted in a proliferation of 
print and broadcast media that undoubtedly help achieve the information-related values 
discussed above. However, while Ghana has a constitutional provision ensuring a right to 
information for its citizens,201 legislation is necessary to realize this right. Access to 
information is clearly important to Ghanaians, but there are substantial obstacles standing 
in the way of a right to information in Ghana. Some of these obstacles can be addressed 
through statutory reform guaranteeing public access to government information, such as 
the Right to Information Bill that Ghana’s Parliament is considering, while others are extra-
legal constraints that legislation may be unable to address. This Section seeks to identify 
the most salient barriers to access to information in Ghana. The obstacles identified include 
refusals to share information, lack of recordkeeping requirements, a disparity between 
state-owned and private media, inequalities across the country, and professionalism 
concerns.  
1. Refusals to Share Information 
 
The government’s unwillingness to share information is one of the most salient 
barriers to access to information in Ghana. Although such refusals have decreased since the 
ratification of the 1992 Constitution and the repeal of the criminal libel law, they still occur. 
At this time, no right to information law exists to guarantee public access to government 
information. Moreover, some government officials are required to keep information 
                                                             
201 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA 1992, Art. 21(1)(f) (“All persons shall have the right to information, 
subject to such qualifications and laws as are necessary in a democratic society.”) 
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confidential, while many government agencies are reluctant to release information even 
when it is unclassified.202 
Access to government information is hampered by a lack of enforceable disclosure 
requirements. For example, Bright Blewu of the Ghana Journalists Association notes that 
Ghana was forced to pay a number of judgments on contracts that the public did not know 
existed.203 Local agents had contracted on behalf of the state, kept their contracts secret, 
and then defaulted. With a right to information law, the public would have had access to 
information regarding those contracts.204 This lack of information from the government 
provides an excuse for journalists to do less digging and hampers investigative 
journalism.205 Yaw Boadu-Ayeboafoh, General Manager of Newspapers at the Daily Graphic, 
concludes that a right to information law is one mechanism for making public officials 
responsive to the needs of the public.206 
The media’s reluctance to obtain and share information—a remnant of the “culture 
of silence”—is also problematic.207 Before ratification of the 1992 Constitution, 
commentators noted that Ghana’s government fostered an environment in which 
journalists engaged in self-censorship and refused to share information with the public for 
fear of government reprisals, such as job loss and violence.208 While journalists are more 
likely to publish stories that criticize the government now than they were in the past, 
                                                             
202 Interview with E. Kwasi Bandua, Chair of the Foreign Affairs Comm. of Parliament, in Accra, Ghana (Mar. 
14, 2013). 
203 Interview with Bright Blewu, supra note 26.  
204 Id. 
205 Interview with Audrey Gadzekpo, supra note 51.  
206 Interview with Yaw Boadu-Ayeboafoh, supra note 29. 
207 See Lusike Lynete Mukhongo, Can the Media in Africa Shape Africa’s Political Future?, 2 J. AFRICAN MEDIA 
STUDIES 339, 345 (2010) (“In a majority of African countries today, the media not only sets the agenda of the 
people and the nation as a whole but the media also influences public opinion with regard to elections, 
constitution making and corruption.”). 
209
 Temin & Smith, supra note 25, at 588. 
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journalists from the state-owned media continue to refuse to publish certain stories and 
instead hand them over to journalists in the private media, who have more freedom to 
publish critical material.209 To be sure, the state-owned media will cover events that 
negatively portray the government, but they rarely go as in-depth as the private media 
does.210 However, the private media are also not entirely free to publish what they wish 
due to other laws on the books that prevent robust information sharing with the public, 
such as civil libel laws and Section 208 of the Criminal Offenses Act.211  
2. Record Keeping 
 
A second major obstacle to access to information in Ghana is the failure to maintain 
relevant records, even when the law requires it. The Ghana Public Records and Archives 
Administration Act, 1997 (Act 535) “[i]mposes on public bodies the duty to maintain 
records”212 and established a Public Records and Archives Administration Department 
(PRAAD), but it is unclear to what extent this law is enforced.213 The Coalition on the Right 
to Information reported, “Proper recordkeeping has been on the backburner of many 
organisations.”214 A right to information law cannot be useful unless the holders of 
information keep accurate records.  
Resource constraints perpetuate poor record keeping. In July 2012, the Daily 
Graphic reported that national records at PRAAD were deteriorating due to poor 
                                                             
209 HASTY, supra note 43, at 77; Interview with Yaw Boadu-Ayeboafoh, supra note 29. 
210 See HASTY, supra note 43, at 73 (“As a witness to the actions of the state, the [state] journalist is expected to 
faithfully record the events, asking questions only for clarification . . . . I never heard a state journalist pose a 
critical question while on assignment.”); Interview with Audrey Gadzekpo, supra note 51. 
211 Interview with E. Kwasi Bandua, supra note 202.  
212 COALITION ON THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION - GHANA, CONCERNS ON THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION BILL 19 (last accessed 
May 6, 2013), available at http://www.rticampaignghana.org/concerns/. 
213 Interview with Audrey Gadzekpo, supra note 51 (reporting that there may be a statute requiring 
organizations to keep records, but implementation is another issue). 
214 COALITION ON THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION - GHANA, CONCERNS ON THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION BILL 19 (last accessed 
May 6, 2013), available at http://www.rticampaignghana.org/concerns/. 
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facilities.215 Moreover, the department has no backup records in case of a fire or natural 
disaster.216 PRAAD’s lack of financial resources for proper record keeping hinders the 
media and the public from retrieving necessary information, especially outside of Accra.217 
Ghana’s eventual goal is digitization of records, which would remove concerns regarding 
poor record keeping facilities, but that requires investments of time and money.218 
Furthermore, there is no uniformity in record-keeping practices across government 
agencies. PRAAD is responsible for establishing national standards for record keeping, but 
it is unclear whether agencies are complying with those standards. Statutory reform could 
address these issues by reinforcing the Ghana Public Records and Archives Administration 
Act and establishing uniform standards for record keeping.  
3. Disparity Between State-Owned and Private Media 
 
 Jennifer Hasty argues, “State and private journalists articulate different forms of 
professional rhetoric, deploy different tactics of newsgathering, negotiate different political 
pressures, and enjoy different forms of compensation and reward for their work.”219 
Disparities between the state-owned and private media influence journalists’ access to 
information and how that information is disseminated to the public.  
For example, information is more readily available to the state-owned media than 
the private media because the state-owned media have greater financial resources and 
                                                             
215 Seth J. Bokpe, National Archives in Danger of Losing Official Documents, DAILY GRAPHIC, July 20, 2012, 
available at http://www.modernghana.com/news/407182/1/ 
national-archives-in-danger-of-losing-official-doc.html. 
216 Id. 
217 See id. (“The department is starved of funds . . . leaving very little for operations in all the 10 regional 
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more access to the government for information.220 Journalists for the state-owned media 
are often invited to the government ministries, the courts, and embassies to report on state 
events.221 In contrast, journalists for the private press are sometimes turned away from 
assignments at state offices. Reporters and counsel for the privately-owned Daily Guide 
stated that the private media cannot cover stories at Flagstaff House (Ghana’s presidential 
palace) and generally do not have as many sources from the government as the state-
owned media do.222 However, the private media are expected to cover the same events as 
the state-owned media and must find a way to access information from the government 
without a right to information law.223 The government justifies its denial of access to the 
private press on the basis that the private media is unprofessional, does not report the 
facts, and promotes defamatory rumors in order to sell more newspapers or attract more 
listeners.224  
 These issues of comparative professionalism, resource disparity, and access to 
information interact in complex ways. Some argue that the private media’s lack of access to 
information from the government and lack of financial resources contribute to 
sensationalism among the private media because they must be sensational to sell their 
papers and make a profit.225 Reporters and counsel at the Daily Guide stated that private 
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media must sell a product to stay afloat because they do not have a great deal of advertising 
revenue.226 Also, businesses are reluctant to place advertisements in the private press for 
fear of upsetting the government, and the private media worry about isolating Ghanaian 
companies through their news coverage.227 Despite financial difficulties, however, 
reporters from the private media feel that they have more freedom to publish what they 
wish and say that journalists often move from the state-owned media to the private 
media“because they want more independence, though they face more financial 
difficulties.”228 
 4. Inequalities Across the Country 
 
Inequalities across the country, particularly between the urban and rural areas, 
present another significant obstacle to the free flow of information. Disparities in literacy 
rates, spoken languages, and resources hamper Ghanaians’ access to information from both 
the government and the media, especially for rural areas of the country. As noted above, 77 
percent of men and 63 percent of women in Ghana are literate,229 but literacy rates are 
much lower in rural areas of Ghana.230 This disparity in literacy rates furthers an urban-
rural divide, where Ghanaians in urban areas are more easily able to retrieve information. 
Additionally, Ghanaians speak a variety of different languages and many do not speak 
English, which is the primary language used in print media and government 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
PAPER NO. 17, at 15 (discussing how the private media relies on sensationalism to make a profit, while the 
state media can “afford to play it safe by avoiding political scandal and what is regarded as sensationalism”). 
226 Interview with representatives from Daily Guide, supra note 222; see also KARIKARI, supra note 70, at 18 
(“Circulation is the key to survival [for private newspapers] as advertising has not shown marked growth.”).  
227 Interview with representatives from Daily Guide, supra note 222. 
228 Interview with representatives from Daily Guide, supra note 222. The Editor of the Daily Guide shared that 
a state editor called him the day of our interview to provide a story that the state editor could not run. Id. 
229 GHANA STATISTICAL SERV., supra note 12, at 12. 
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communications.231 Ghanaians in urban centers are more likely to speak English,232 thus 
furthering the urban-rural divide.  
Ada, a town on the eastern coast of Ghana, provides a good illustration of how wide 
the information-access gap is between Accra, where most media outlets are headquartered 
and the population is largely literate, and rural towns, where many adults are illiterate and 
only understand their local dialect. People in Ada rely on the radio to access information 
because the major newspapers are printed in English.233 Although the proliferation of cell 
phone and radio use has helped to decrease the information gap between urban and rural 
areas, rural towns like Ada still have limited access to information through the print 
media.234 
In addition, disparities between the rich and poor perpetuate an elite-dominated 
media that hampers the ability of poor Ghanaians to access and influence information. For 
example, Seyram Avle discusses the “global cosmopolitans” or “Argonauts,” a small but 
growing cultural elite in Ghanaian urban centers.235 This group consists of Ghanaians who 
travel to the West to work and study and then return to Ghana to start-up companies, 
which are often major media businesses.236 Avle argues that this “educated and fairly 
wealthy group is defined by its education and access to information,” and that it now 
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determines what is heard by the nation.237 Thus, this new cultural elite has access to 
information that average Ghanaians do not, and as a result, the elite participate in agenda-
setting and decision making that may enhance disparities in access to information by 
choosing to report on news that is more relevant to their class.238 This trend is likely to 
perpetuate the urban-rural divide. 
5. Professionalism 
 
Some journalists’ lack of professionalism presents an obstacle for public access to 
information from the media. Audrey Gadzekpo laments, “Many journalists display a lack of 
ethics, professionalism, and a weak commitment to democratic ethos.”239 The National 
Media Commission (NMC) is charged with “[t]aking all appropriate measures to ensure the 
establishment and maintenance of the highest journalistic standards, including the 
investigation, mediation and settlement of complaints made against or by the press or 
other mass media.”240 However, the NMC is unable to sanction journalists for professional 
violations, which hampers its role in upholding high journalistic standards.241 Moreover, 
the GJA, which includes journalists from both the state-owned and private media, has 
created a uniform set of ethical standards, but these standards are not enforceable.242 
In addition, many stakeholders feel that the lack of training required to practice 
journalism is a hindrance to professionalism in the field. Despite the existence of training 
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institutions such as the Ghana Institute of Journalism and the University of Ghana’s School 
of Communication Studies, many Ghanaians feel they cannot trust journalists to report 
accurately or objectively on important issues.243 Training by qualified teachers is available, 
but some people become journalists because they think journalism is “glamorous,” and 
they do not pursue training because it is not required.244 The lack of training and 
professional requirements for journalists is one reason why some politicians suggest 
journalists should not be trusted with wide access to information. 
However, this reasoning can also be employed as an excuse not to pass a right to 
information law, when in fact a lack of access to information likely perpetuates 
sensationalism, particularly in the private media. If the media cannot access information to 
verify their reports, they simply publish whatever they have.245 The Honorable E. Kwasi 
Bandua, MP for the Biakoye constituency, predicts that when a right to information law is 
passed and it is easier for media outlets to obtain information, there will likely be fewer 
false reports in the media.246 
6. Conclusion 
 
 Although statutory reform cannot address all of these obstacles, a right to 
information law is necessary to ensure that Ghanaian citizens’ constitutional right to 
information is realized. A right to information law can address governmental refusals to 
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disclose information, poor record keeping, professionalism, and many of the disparities 
between the state-owned and private media by placing them on more equal footing. Such a 
law could also reduce inequalities across the country by ensuring that information is made 
available to all Ghanaian citizens, regardless of wealth and geography. A right to 
information law is a crucial first step toward strengthening Ghana’s media and democratic 
development. 
C. The Right to Information Bill: A Promising Solution  
 
1. The RTI Bill: Overview 
 
 Though Ghana does not yet have a statutory framework in place to address these 
obstacles to the free flow of information, many government officials and civil society 
groups—especially the Coalition on the Right to Information—have been pressing for legal 
reform. In the wake of the 2012 elections, there is 
cause for optimism that that a Right to Information 
Bill will finally be passed into law. Such a bill was 
last proposed in 2009, and that proposal—while 
imperfect—provides a good starting point from 
which to evaluate future reforms. To date, no other 
laws create a mechanism by which a citizen can 
realize the right to information enshrined in the 
Constitution. Thus, the RTI Bill is necessary to make 
the Constitutional right to information a reality for 
Ghanaian citizens. This Section explains the 
constitutional underpinnings and structure of the 
The Common Law 
     Ghana employs a common law 
system, meaning that if Parliament does 
not pass an RTI law, it would be 
possible for a citizen to seek a judicially 
crafted RTI system. However, such a 
judicially crafted remedy is unlikely. 
First, most of the affirmative guarantees 
of the Constitution do not create a direct 
cause of action.1 Second, judges would 
be hesitant to venture into an area of 
law traditionally seen as legislative.2 
Therefore, if there is to be an RTI 
system in Ghana, it will have to come 
from Parliament.  
 
1
 Interview with Nene Amegatcher, 
President, Ghana Bar Association, in Accra, 
Ghana (Mar. 15, 2013). 
2
 Interview with Kwaku Agyeman Budu, 
Lecturer of Law, GIMPA Law School, in 
Accra, Ghana (Mar. 13, 2013). 
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most recent version of the RTI Bill,247 and offers various recommendations that might 
improve the Bill further.  
2. Constitutional Underpinnings  
Article 21 of the Ghanaian Constitution contains provisions protecting various 
personal liberties, including freedom of speech, assembly, and religion.248 Included in this 
vast panoply of liberties is a personal right to information: “All persons shall have the right 
to . . . information.”249 This guarantee is, however, “subject to such qualifications and laws 
as are necessary in a democratic society.”250  
The obvious question raised by this qualifying language is what limitations to access 
to information are necessary in a democratic society. The proposed RTI Bill is an attempt to 
answer this question, and to elaborate and codify that constitutional guarantee. The Bill’s 
preamble states that its purpose is “to provide for the implementation of the constitutional 
right to information.”251 Moreover, the preamble directly responds to the Constitution’s call 
for such “laws as are necessary in a democratic society” by setting forth a series of 
exemptions that are “necessary and consistent with the protection of the public interest in 
a democratic society.”252 When passed into law, the Bill could give Ghanaian citizens a 
concrete way to realize their constitutionally guaranteed right to information. 
 
                                                             
247 Currently only the 2009 version of the RTI Bill is publically available. While individual provisions or 
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3. Structure of the RTI Bill 
 
 The RTI Bill imagines a right to information that centers on citizen petitions to 
government agencies. In response to these petitions, the agency can divulge the 
information sought or, for cause, reject the petition. Much of the Bill describes certain 
classes of exempt information that falls outside the default position that all information 
should be divulged. The Bill further specifies an appeals process for denied petitions, as 
well as a fee structure for filing petitions.  
Not all information disclosures depend on citizen petitions—the Bill places an 
affirmative obligation on government to “make available to the people, general information 
on their governance without application from a specific person.”253 However, this one-
sentence imperative lacks specificity beyond a reference to Article 67 of the Constitution, 
                                                             
253 Id. § 2.  
RTI in Zimbabwe 
     Zimbabwe’s right to information law, the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA)1, is widely 
criticized for controlling the media and suppressing free speech. This criticism comes in large part because of AIPPA’s 
twelve categorical exemptions from the presumption of access to information. The AIPPA has some agency-based 
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interests of public bodies or of the State, conservation of heritage sites, personal safety, business interests of a third party, 
and personal privacy. Finally, information is exempt if its divulgence would affect the law enforcement process and national 
security.   
     Ghanaians frequently criticize the numerous broad exemptions in AIPPA, and they view Zimbabwe as an example that 
Ghana should not follow.2 However, Ghana’s most current draft of the Right to Information Bill includes similar 
exemptions to AIPPA, and Ghana’s draft contains one more exemption than AIPPA. For example, both bills contain blanket 
exemptions for deliberations of the Cabinet and information relating to intergovernmental relations, business interests of a 
third party, and law enforcement and national security. Moreover, like Zimbabwe’s bill, many of the exemptions in Ghana’s 
RTI Bill include broad, vague language that unduly widens the scope of the exemptions. Instead, Ghana’s exemptions 
should be “justified only if they are necessary to protect the public interest or the rights and freedoms of others.”3 
 
1Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, Chapter 10:27 (2002), available at http://www.parlzim.gov.zw/attachments/ 
article/96/ACCESS_TO_INFORMATION_AND_PROTECTION_OF_PRIVACY_ACT_10_27.pdf. 
2
 Interview with Ghana Broad. Corp., in Accra, Ghana (Mar. 12, 2013). 
3
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which requires the President to deliver a State of the Nation message to Parliament. It is 
unclear if this aspirational provision will have any practical effect. 
 Aside from the “general information” disclosure requirement, the heart of the RTI 
Bill is, as noted above, a system of citizen petitions for individual pieces of information. 
Requests for information must be made in writing to the relevant government agency.254 If 
an applicant is unable to write an application in English, the application can be made to a 
government officer who will transcribe the request.255 Government agencies must 
designate an information officer to handle all requests and must publish a manual detailing 
the request procedure for that agency.256 Upon receiving the request, the government 
information officer must decide whether to grant access to the information sought, grant 
partial access, or reject the petition.257 If the information sought is in the possession of 
another government agency, the information officer can transfer the request to the 
appropriate agency.258 If the appropriate information officer denies a request, the 
petitioner may appeal that decision to the Minister responsible for that government 
agency.259 The decision of the Minister can be appealed to the Supreme Court.260 
 The default position of the Bill is that information should be granted.261 The Bill, 
however, carves out thirteen classes of exempt information that the government need not 
divulge in response to a petition. Some of these exemptions are agency-based: information 
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is exempt if it comes from the Office of the President or Vice President,262 or from the office 
of Cabinet Ministers.263 Other exemptions are based on the subject matter of the 
information sought: information is exempt if it relates to “law enforcement, public safety 
[or] national security,”264 if it would reveal economic information about third parties,265 or 
if it pertains to privileged legal, medical or personal topics.266 Finally, information can be 
exempted based on the consequences of divulgence: information is exempt if divulgence 
would affect international relations267 or national defense,268 or if it would “create undue 
disturbance in the ordinary course of business or trade in the country.”269 
 Further provisions of the Bill provide a timeline for rejecting or complying with a 
request for information.270 Petitioners are required to pay a fee,271 and may be required to 
pay an additional deposit if “the costs to the agency for dealing with the application are 
likely to exceed the amount of the application fee.”272 However, fees can be waived in cases 
of financial hardship.273 Finally, the Bill also lays out a mechanism for petitioning 
government agencies to amend internal records.274 
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4. How the RTI Bill Addresses Obstacles to Accessing 
Information 
 
The RTI Bill aims to provide specific guidance 
on how Ghana will fulfill its obligations to its people 
and the fundamental right to access information. Yet, 
lawmakers also recognize that the Bill must include 
sufficient language to safeguard the right to 
information, rather than create obstacles to full 
realization of this fundamental right. The current draft 
proposal is a positive step in safeguarding this right, 
but it is not perfect. Amending the latest draft 
proposal is necessary to create a framework that 
provides both the media and Ghanaians with 
meaningful access to information. This Report has 
already identified the most salient barriers to access 
to information in Ghana.275  This Section includes 
recommendations for addressing these barriers, with particular focus on provisions within 
the current proposal itself. For this reason, solutions to the extra-legal obstacles will not be 
addressed.276 This Section identifies eight areas in which lawmakers can add or amend 
language in the draft proposal to effectively provide solutions to the legal obstacles 
identified. After a brief analysis of each problematic provision, this Section highlights 
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     The Coalition on the Right to 
Information is comprised of numerous 
stakeholders in Ghana including the 
primary convener, the Commonwealth 
Human Rights Initiative, as well as 
the National Media Commission, the 
Ghana Bar Association, religious 
organizations, journalists, and other 
non-governmental organizations.1 
Since 2010, the Coalition has 
advocated for passage of the right to 
information bill, and has marched in 
front of Parliament twice in hopes of 
pressuring lawmakers to take action.2 
     The Coalition sent a petition to 
Parliament after its march, noting that 
“access to information offers the key 
to deepening democracy and 
quickening development that Ghana is 
seeking.  It lays the foundation upon 
which to build good governance, 
transparency, accountability, and 
eliminate corruption.”3 
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possible amendments to each section. These recommendations draw on the work of the 
Coalition on the Right to Information.  
a. Refusal to Share Information 
 
As noted above, there is no law in Ghana guaranteeing public access to government 
information.277 At the heart of the RTI Bill is an attempt to overcome the government’s 
historic reluctance to disclose information to the public.278 Requiring government officials 
to comply with valid requests for information is a critical legal step to overcoming cultural 
and historical resistance to government transparency. The RTI Bill creates a system that 
mandates government responsiveness to citizen requests for information. Requiring 
compliance with a valid application is “one step towards making public officials responsive 
to needs of the people.”279 It is imperative that the RTI Bill limit the discretion available to 
government officials to deny requests “as necessary in a democratic society”280 or based on 
other qualifications. 
The current proposal contains too many exemptions and grants too much discretion 
to government officials to deny requests. This is a significant obstacle and the exemptions 
must be limited. The most current draft of the Bill provides 13 categorical exemptions, as 
noted above.281 The broad scope of these exemptions has caused concern. Some lawmakers 
and other stakeholders believe the exemptions are too numerous and “would undermine 
the effectiveness of the Bill.”282 For example, the broad, categorical exemptions for the 
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offices of the President, Vice President, and Ministers “enable government and public 
officials to withhold information when there is no necessity not to make disclosure.”283 
Any exemptions in the bill should be “narrowly formulated and proportional to [a] 
legitimate purpose.284 Rather than providing blanket exemptions for the offices of the 
President, Vice President, and Ministers, these offices should be required to demonstrate “a 
direct causal link” between disclosure and a sufficient harm to the public interest or the 
rights and freedoms of others.285 
 Other exemptions include vague language that fails to provide a reasonable 
limitation to the exemption. For example, Section 13 of the RTI Bill states that information 
related to the internal work of agencies may be exempt from disclosure if disclosure would 
reveal: 
An opinion, an advice, a report or a recommendation contained, 
prepared or recorded, or a consultation or a deliberation held in the 
course of or for the purpose of making a decision in the public service 
or an agency of the Government and which can reasonably be 
expected to frustrate or inhibit the candid deliberative process of an 
agency or between agencies is exempt information.286 
This exemption does not require any causal relationship to any potential harm and 
provides the opportunity to exempt critical information from disclosure without sufficient 
justification.  
b. Record Keeping 
 
The fundamental right to information presupposes that information is accessible as a 
practical matter. Yet accessibility is a significant obstacle to realizing this right in Ghana. As 
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one lawmaker said, “Record keeping in this environment is very bad. This is central and it’s 
a major problem.”287 A central part of this problem stems from the lack of compliance with 
the Ghana Public Records and Archives Administration Act.288 Moreover, the current draft 
of the RTI Bill does not contain any guidance on how government agencies should comply 
with the Act. If this issue is not addressed directly, “the right to information becomes 
illusory.”289 In 2012, an editorial in the state-owned newspaper the Daily Graphic urged the 
government to amend the Public Records Act, stating that “the time has come for the 
government to take a critical look at record-keeping in the country and encourage all 
institutions to upgrade their record-keeping capabilities.” The RTI Bill should address this 
issue effectively and provide sufficient language to reinforce the Public Records Act.290 
c. Oversight by an Independent Entity & the Appeals Process 
 
 The RTI Bill provides that the “Minister responsible for Justice has ministerial 
responsibility for the effective implementation of this Act.”291 This provision is potentially 
problematic. The Minister of Justice has obligations to the government, but would also be 
responsible for ensuring that the government adheres to its obligations under the RTI Bill. 
These twin obligations are in tension and may conflict. Instead, the RTI Bill should mandate 
oversight by an independent body in order to ensure fair and equitable treatment and 
effective implementation of the RTI framework.292 This independent organ could also serve 
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as an appellate tribunal to adjudicate disputes arising from denied requests for 
information.293 
 Ideally, any disputes arising under the RTI regime would be handled 
administratively rather than in the court system.294 This would provide efficient dispute 
resolution without unduly burdening the judiciary. The current Bill provides for 
administrative review by the minister responsible for the agency involved in the dispute.295 
An applicant may then appeal the decision to the Supreme Court for further review.296 The 
review mechanism, while laudable in many respects, could create practical impediments 
for Ghanaians who lack substantial financial resources. Specifically, it could deter 
applicants from challenging ministerial decisions because appealing to the Supreme Court 
is costly and time-consuming.297 The review process can be improved by granting authority 
to a senior officer in every agency to conduct internal reviews and by including a right of 
appeal before the independent oversight organ prior to seeking judicial review.298 
d. Fee Requirements 
  
The Minister for Justice is responsible for setting fee requirements for applications 
for information. The RTI Bill provides guidance on how the Minister should determine the 
fees. Clause 50(3) states: 
The guidelines shall specify the amount payable for 
(a) a search for every hour or fraction of an hour of manual search 
required in excess of two hours to locate the information, 
(b) computer access and any other costs incurred in locating, 
retrieving, processing and photo copying the information, 
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(c) the cost of preparing the information for disclosure, and 
(d) the postage costs.299 
 
The Bill also requires an advance deposit if the cost of producing the information is likely to 
exceed the application fees.300 The Minister of the relevant agency may authorize a waiver 
of the fee in cases where the applicant would suffer financial hardship if required to pay the 
fee.301 
The proposal’s current fee structure is overly complex and would impose undue 
burdens on applicants. For example, the time it takes to retrieve information is a central 
element of the fee structure, yet this would penalize applicants for the government’s 
inefficient recordkeeping apparatus.302 At worst, fees should be limited to the “actual cost 
of reproduction of information.”303 In addition, the decision to waive fees in accordance 
with Clause 51 should not rest solely in the hands of the Minister. Rather, the information 
officer or other senior officer should have the authority to grant waivers in appropriate 
cases.304 
e. Timely Access  
  
Full realization of the fundamental right to information entails receiving the 
information in a timely fashion. Applicants should reasonably expect public officials to 
process their requests “as expeditiously as possible.”305 Undue delay renders this right 
illusory, particularly in instances where the applicant, perhaps a journalist under the 
pressure of a deadline, is unable to obtain the requested information in time to file a story. 
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In this context, timely access to information would incentivize accurate reporting and 
reduce the number of false reports, thereby improving the quality of journalism in 
Ghana.306 But the need for timely access is not limited to journalists—all applicants have a 
right to receive, process, and act upon the information within a reasonable time. 
 The current Bill includes numerous time extensions. If all extensions were applied, it 
could take more than five months for an applicant to receive the requested information. 
This potential delay is unreasonable and subverts the right to information.307 Information 
Officers should be required to respond to applications promptly, and time extensions 
should be limited situations where they are strictly necessary. Their length, too, should be 
limited. 
f. Inclusion of Private Entities 
  
A central tenet of the RTI Bill is that government should be held accountable to the 
public. This accountability should extend to all government actors, including private 
entities working on behalf of the government.308 As a consequence, the RTI Bill should 
provide stronger language mandating access to information related to private entities that 
are “funded by the public purse, carry out public actions, exploit the nation’s natural 
resources, or where the information is required for the protection of an individual’s 
fundamental human right or freedom.”309 
 The current proposal makes inclusion of private entities dependent upon an 
additional legislative act.310 In this sense, the scope of the Bill is limited only to state-actors, 
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even where private entities operate within the public sphere. The Bill should be amended 
to broaden the scope to include these private entities.       
g. Affirmative Duty to Disclose Information       
 
The Bill should provide greater clarity on the government’s affirmative legal duty to 
disclose information independent of a citizen petition. While the proposal would require 
disclosure of “general information” on governance,311 more clarity on what information is 
required, and at what intervals it should be disclosed, is needed. Providing Ghanaians with 
access to “accurate and timely information about important matters of governance”312 is an 
important foundational step to demonstrate the government’s commitment to realizing the 
fundamental right to information enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution. 
h. Implementation 
 
 Enacting the RTI Bill will impose myriad requirements on state actors. Ministers will 
have to create and distribute manuals on how the Bill operates within their respective 
ministries, and Information Officers will need to be appointed to ensure compliance with 
the Bill. Importantly, the government will have to improve its recordkeeping capacity in 
order to provide the necessary information to applicants. Given the magnitude of the Bill’s 
framework, implementation dates should be included in the Bill. Without a timeline for 
implementation, Ghana will run the risk of having ineffectual legislation and expose itself to 
liability for failure to comply with requests. Implementation dates could include specific 
phases of implementation as well as a maximum time limit for enforcement.313 
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 The chart below summarizes the eight obstacles identified and briefly summarizes 
this Report’s proposed solutions. 
Table 3. Obstacles and Solutions in the RTI Bill 
 
Obstacles Identified Solution 
Refusal to Share Information Limit exemptions and discretion granted to government officials; 
Require direct link between exemptions and the harm sought to 
be avoided 
 
Record Keeping Reinforce and strengthen the Public Records Act 
 
Oversight & Appeal Create independent oversight body that has power to review 
decisions upon appeal by an applicant prior to appeal in the 
courts  
 
Fee Requirements Limit fees to the cost of reproducing the documents, rather than 
including costs for retrieval time 
 
Timely Access Amend time limit provisions to ensure timely access to 
information 
 
Inclusion of Private Entities Require compliance by private entities involved in state matters 
 
Affirmative Duty to Disclose 
Information 
Provide greater clarity on what the state must disclose 
independent of citizen requests, and how often it must disclose 
this information 
 
Implementation Provide clear timeline for implementation of the RTI Bill 
framework 
 
  
The RTI Bill represents a significant step towards making Article 21 efficacious, and its 
passage would signal a victory for Ghana, for fundamental human rights, and for 
transparent governance. The RTI Bill would also bring the country into harmony with 
international norms. It would enable the media to pursue more effectively its goals of 
holding government responsible and informing Ghanaians of pertinent news in a timely 
73 
 
fashion. Lawmakers have been considering the RTI Bill for several years, and many 
stakeholders are optimistic a bill will pass through Parliament this year.  
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V. Sharing Information Through Broadcast 
 
While the RTI Bill centers on the right to receive information, the right to share 
information is intimately connected. These two rights operate in tandem to influence 
democratic government. In Ghana, the right to share information is dependent in large part 
on the mediums by which Ghanaians receive news. Because radio is such a prominent 
source of information across the country, providing a sufficient legal and regulatory 
framework to guide the broadcast media is critical to ensuring information is shared 
effectively.  
Lawmakers first proposed a bill to provide comprehensive broadcast regulation in 
2007, yet efforts stalled without producing a legislative enactment.314 Recently, President 
John Dramani Mahama said that the government would prioritize the speedy passage of the 
Broadcast Bill.315 This Section takes a closer look at the theoretical foundation of the 
                                                             
314 Interview with Wilna Quarmyne, supra note 28.  
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21, 2013) http://www.ghana.gov.gh/index.php/news/general-news/20049-govt-to-fast-track-passage-of-
broadcasting-bill-president-mahama. 
Talking Drums 
Talking drummers were the original Ghanaian broadcasters.  They performed the critical task of communicating news 
amongst neighboring villages, using the airwaves, and their broadcasts would range up to five miles.1 And for many generations 
of Ghanaians, the talking drum was the primary source of news. In some rural villages, the talking drum was the primary means 
of receiving and disseminating news up until the last decade of the 20th century.3  Though the mode of broadcasting has 
changed, broadcasting’s importance to Ghanaian civil society has not.  
1 ROBERT GARDNER & DENNIS SHORTELLE, FROM TALKING DRUMS TO THE INTERNET: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMMUNICATIONS 
TECHNOLOGY 276 (1997). 
2 Id. 
3
 Interview with Residents of Dogo, Ghana (Mar. 16, 2013). 
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Broadcast Bill, as well as obstacles to effective implementation of the Bill and this Report’s 
proposed solutions to these obstacles. 
 
A. The Importance of Sharing Information 
 
The freedom to “impart information and ideas through any media” is recognized as 
a universal human right.316 The right to impart information has been recognized as “one of 
the most precious rights of man” for centuries.317 And, like generations before, the 
international community today deeply cherishes that right. It is codified in several 
international accords, including the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the 
American Convention on Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.318 
The right to impart information is so highly regarded because it is fundamental to a 
democratic society.319 The right to impart information facilitates citizens sharing and 
critically engaging with each other’s ideas. Democratic societies thrive when various 
viewpoints are expressed.320 The diversity of opinions and perspectives strengthens 
democracy because, within the marketplace of ideas, good ideas flourish and bad ideas 
fail.321 The right to impart information protects the ability of individuals to bring their 
                                                             
316 Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 19, supra note 33. 
317 Declaration of the Rights of Man art. 11 (1789), available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/rightsof.asp. 
318 EVE SALOMON, GUIDELINES FOR BROADCAST REGULATION 15 (2008). Ghana is a signatory to both the African 
Charter on Human and People’s Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
319 Id.  
320 Id. at 15. 
321 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (“[U]ltimate good desired is better reached by free trade 
in ideas.”). 
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unique ideas to the market.322 Without that right, the marketplace of ideas would be a 
dilapidated dump devoid of ideas. 
Broadcasting plays a critical role in maintaining a thriving marketplace of ideas. 
Television and radio broadcasting command loyal audiences, filling the airwaves that 
circulate information around the globe. Both television and radio broadcasting facilitate the 
free flow of ideas, opinions, and information to citizens. These streams of information 
enable citizens to effectively exercise other democratic rights, including the right to vote. 
While radio and television broadcasting play an essential role in democratic development, 
radio is by far the most popular and accessible medium for most Ghanaians.323 For this 
reason, this Section focuses on radio broadcasting. The remainder of the Section will 
consider the relationship between radio broadcasting and the right to information by 
examining (1) radio’s exceptionalism, (2) models of radio broadcasting, (3) approaches to 
radio regulation, and (4) convergence. 
1. Radio Exceptionalism 
 
Radio broadcasting is an exceptional medium. It is among the world’s most popular 
broadcasting mediums, and there are no signs that radio’s growing prominence will slow 
down.324 Radio’s sustained preeminence amongst its peer mediums is a consequence of 
several factors. Unlike other electronic mediums, radio broadcasts are accessible in most 
parts of the world, from sprawling metropolises to bucolic homesteads.325 Around the 
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323 E.g., Akpojivi Ufuoma, Community Radio Regulation and Its Challenges in Ghana, 4 JOURNAL OF AFRICAN MEDIA 
STUDIES 193, 195 (2012) (noting that, in light of high illiteracy rates and a stark urban-rural divide, “radio [is] 
the only alternative medium available to the marginalized 52.2 percent of Ghana’s population residing in 
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324 UNITED NATIONS EDUC., SCIENTIFIC & CULTURAL ORG., COMMUNITY RADIO HANDBOOK 6 (2001). 
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globe, there are more than 20,000 radio stations and 2 billion radio receivers.326 For the 
775 million adults and 122 million youths around the world who are illiterate, radio is the 
primary means for receiving news and entertainment.327 Call-in programs have also 
contributed to radio’s primacy. Through these programs, listeners can phone their station 
to express their opinions about an issue.328 Economically, radio is affordable for both 
listeners and station owners.329 Because of radio’s reach, affordability, and popularity, 
radio broadcasts are a critical medium through which the right to impart information is 
realized.  
2. Models of Radio Broadcasting 
 
Within the world of broadcasting, there are three dominant broadcasting sectors: 
commercial, community, and public.330 Each sector plays a specific role in the realization of 
the right to impart information.  
a. Commercial 
 
Private individuals or enterprises operate commercial radio stations. The rise of 
commercial radio is in part a reaction to a deep distrust of state intervention in 
broadcasting, which is seen as “dangerous” and a threat to the freedom to impart 
information.331 Private individuals, rather than the state, must have full control over 
editorial content to fully realize the right to impart information. In practice, private 
broadcasters can largely make decisions about content independent of the state. They do 
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327 UNITED NATIONS EDUC., SCIENTIFIC & CULTURAL ORG., INST. FOR STATISTICS, ADULT AND YOUTH LITERACY STANDARDS, 
1 (2013), available at http://www.uis.unesco.org/FactSheets/Documents/fs20-literacy-day-2012-en-v3.pdf. 
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not, however, have unlimited discretion to determine content. All programming decisions 
must be consistent with their country’s broadcasting laws. Additionally, the programming 
is driven in large part by concerns about how to attract more listeners.332 Larger audiences 
translate into more advertising revenue. Broadly speaking, private broadcasting facilitates 
media pluralism.333 As media pluralism increases, wider arrays of ideological and political 
viewpoints are reflected in the media.334 Thus, private broadcasters are providing greater 
opportunities for “more voices to be heard.”335 
b. Community  
 
In most cases, community radio stations are non-profit organizations that focus on 
the “special interests and needs . . . of the [communities they are] licensed to serve.”336 
Community broadcasters draw directly on the support of their community members to 
participate in the management, operation, and programming of the station.337 Community 
radio is different from a public service broadcaster, discussed below, because the targeted 
audience is much smaller. The public broadcasters’ intended target is the entire nation,338 
whereas the community broadcaster is limited to its relevant, specific community.339 “A 
                                                             
332 Id. 
333 Mukhongo, supra note 207, at 347. 
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336 UNITED NATIONS EDUC., SCIENTIFIC & CULTURAL ORG., COMMUNITY RADIO HANDBOOK, supra note 324, at 6; Ghana’s 
definition of community radio varies slightly but significantly from that contained in the African Charter on 
Broadcasting, drafted in Windhoek in 2001, which defines community media as media “which is for, by and 
about the community, whose ownership and management is representative of the community, which pursues 
a social development agenda and which is non-profit.” The NCA, upon urging by the GCRN, now defines 
community radio as “radio that is about, for, by and of a specific marginalized community, whose ownership 
and management is representative of that community, which pursues a participatory social development 
agenda, and which is non-profit, non sectarian and non partisan.” Interview with Wilna Quarmyne, supra note 
28. 
337 UNITED NATIONS EDUC., SCIENTIFIC & CULTURAL ORG., COMMUNITY RADIO HANDBOOK, supra note 324, at 6. 
338 UNITED NATIONS EDUC., SCIENTIFIC & CULTURAL ORG., PUBLIC BROADCASTING: WHY AND HOW, supra note 331, at 
11. 
339 UNITED NATIONS EDUC., SCIENTIFIC & CULTURAL ORG., COMMUNITY RADIO HANDBOOK, supra note 324, at 9. 
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community is considered a group of people who share common characteristics and/or 
interests.”340 Those shared characteristics can be based on language, ethnicity, geographic 
region, or even economic livelihood. At its core, community radio is motivated by a desire 
to “treat its listeners as subjects and participants.”341 To that end, community radio 
advocates have sought to ensure that members of the community contribute funding to the 
stations so as to maintain independence from political or economic interests.342 
c. Public  
 
Public broadcasting has been defined as “a meeting place where all citizens are 
welcome and considered equal.”343 State-supported or state-owned corporations generally 
oversee public broadcasting and seek to promote these laudable goals.344 The pillars of 
universality, diversity, independence, and distinctiveness underpin public broadcasting. 
Universality refers to securing access for every citizen in the country. Diversity is a 
commitment to varied program genres, target audiences, and discussion subjects. 
Independence underscores public broadcasting’s commitment to a robust exchange of 
ideas. And distinctiveness “requires that the service offered by public broadcasting 
distinguish itself from that of other broadcasting services.”345 These core commitments to 
universality, diversity, independence, and distinctiveness inform public broadcasting’s 
primary purpose. Public broadcasting is intended to be an “information and education 
tool.”346 Its goal is to further citizens’ understanding so they can make informed 
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decisions.347 The state-owned corporations that run public broadcasting stations develop 
the broadcasting policies and programming and receive the majority of their funding from 
license fees.348 State supported broadcasters are not to be confused with government 
broadcasters. The duty of loyalty for public broadcasters is to the public, not to the 
presiding political party.349 
3. Approaches to Regulation 
 
Because of its exceptional nature, radio broadcasting has been recognized as “the 
most powerful means of communication in the world.”350 Neither states nor private 
interests have overlooked the power of radio broadcasting.351 Since the inception of 
broadcasting, states and commercial interests have sought to harness its power for their 
own ends. To prevent monopolization by either the state or commercial interests, various 
broadcasting regulations have attempted to limit their influence. These regulations are 
premised on the idea that the radio airwaves are a public good.352 According to 
international treaties, nations are assigned a limited spectrum for broadcasting, making the 
nation’s airwaves a scarce and valuable good.353 Because radio broadcasters are taking 
advantage of a public good, they assume an obligation to use it fairly and judiciously for the 
public’s benefit.354 To ensure that broadcasters are fulfilling their obligation, states have 
utilized three different regulatory tools: frequency allocation, content regulation, and 
structural regulation.  
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a. Frequency Allocation  
 
The state’s most powerful tool is frequency allocation and associated technical 
requirements. Radio stations are mandated to transmit at a “certain power, wattage, [and] 
on a precise frequency within a particular market.”355 The process that radio broadcasters 
must go through in order to transmit at a certain frequency is known as licensing.356 
Licenses authorize broadcasters to transmit on a particular frequency for a specified period 
of time.357 Each country takes a different approach to licensing. Some countries sell 
licenses.358 Others hold competitions.359 And still others simply give licenses away.360 
Though states have different policies regarding how a broadcaster can obtain a license, 
most countries decline to permanently sell airwaves because they would lose the power to 
use a related tool: content regulation.  
b. Content Regulation  
 
Content regulation is about “protection.”361 On the one hand, states protect the 
public’s right to share information without state interference, and on the other, they 
protect the public from being harmed and offended.362 States design content regulations to 
balance these dual objectives. Through standards that emphasize accuracy and 
independence, states can ensure that broadcasters remain accountable to the public. For 
those broadcasters that fail to comply with states’ standards, states have a gradation of 
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disciplinary procedures that they can exercise. Generally, states will first fine a broadcaster 
for noncompliance, then suspend the broadcaster’s license, and, finally, revoke its license.  
c. Structural Regulation 
 
States employ structural regulation to keep broadcasters from abdicating their 
responsibility to the public. Scholars have noted that monopolies pose the gravest threat to 
public interest in the broadcasting realm.363 Though not all owners will interfere in a 
broadcaster’s editorial decisions, “ownership always implies a degree of actual or potential 
control and it can be an obstacle to pluralism and diversity.”364 Structural regulations are 
designed to promote diversity of ownership and to prevent the rise of broadcasting 
monopolies. Structural regulation achieves this goal by limiting both where and when 
media companies can enter certain markets. The restrictions imposed on when players can 
enter certain markets have an added benefit: diversity of broadcasting ownerships 
encourages diverse programming.   
Countries that have an independent broadcasting sector generally have an 
independent regulator to monitor that sector.365 Having an independent regulator ensures 
that the state will not interfere in the licensing process.366 In some countries, however, the 
ruling government oversees the licensing process.367 In many of these countries, the 
broadcasters who are appointed tend to overwhelmingly support the ruling government.368 
An independent regulatory body avoids this political quicksand.369 If the independent 
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regulatory body is established by statute, then it will shore up public confidence in the 
regulator and licensing process. This, in turn, reinforces the public’s faith in the accuracy 
and objectivity of the information being broadcast.  
4. Future Developments: Convergence 
 
Convergence is transforming the broadcasting landscape. Convergence is the 
combination of “all types of media in digital form.”370 Before digitization, television, radio, 
telephone, and the internet each utilized a distinct band to transmit their frequencies.371 
The meteoric advancements in 4-G technology have allowed different television, radio, 
phone, and internet waves to be transmitted on a single frequency.372 The blurring of 
boundaries between traditional mediums has changed how radio broadcasters 
communicate to their audiences. Radio broadcasts can be heard on computers, mobile 
phones, televisions, and tablets. Convergence accelerates this integration. It has changed 
not only how broadcasters communicate to their audiences, but also who is communicating 
to those audiences. 
There has been media consolidation at the international, national, and local levels, 
which has led to a decline in ownership diversity. The rapid changes wrought by 
convergence in broadcasting have left regulators in a quandary, challenging the 
fundamental assumptions that underlie present regulatory frameworks.373 The digitization 
of media is transforming the spectrum of airwaves from a scarce public good into an 
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abundant one. Regulators no longer have exclusive control to allocate frequencies. 
Broadcasters can circumvent regulatory authorities by broadcasting online. 374 
 In response to the convergence revolution, many governments have empowered a 
single regulatory body to tend to the new broadcasting landscape.375 Ghana’s most recent 
proposed broadcasting legislation fails to heed this international trend.  The wisdom of 
Ghana’s decision to depart from the international community on regulation is yet to be 
seen. What is certain is that lawmakers’ decisions regarding convergence and other issues 
of broadcasting regulation will have lasting implications on Ghana’s marketplace of ideas.  
B. Obstacles to Information-Sharing 
 
As previously discussed, more than 35 percent of the Ghanaian population is 
illiterate,376 meaning that a significant number of citizens do not have access to the 
country’s increasingly robust print media.377 Radio, as a consequence, is one of the fastest 
growing instruments of mass communication in the nation378 and the most trusted form of 
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media for most Ghanaians.379 The majority of Ghanaians are dependent on the broadcast 
sector for crucial information concerning state affairs and local politics.380 Thus, obstacles 
to the free dissemination of information are particularly salient in their impact on radio 
broadcasting.  
Nevertheless, there exists a troubling absence of constitutionally adequate means 
for allocating frequency to radio stations.381 This absence not only endangers the viability 
of broadcasters themselves, but also imperils the necessary access to information that 
forms the bedrock of a constitutional democracy. The need for rational and effective 
broadcasting regulation in Ghana has never been more crucial. On its success hangs the 
possibility of lasting growth and stability. This Section outlines the most pressing obstacles 
confronting the ability to share information through radio broadcasting in Ghana. 
1. Inequalities Across the Country 
 
Though radio is by far the most popular medium in Ghana, the population’s access 
to radio—and broadcasters’ ability to establish broadcasting stations—varies significantly 
across the nation. There are a number of obstacles to radio penetration across Ghana. For 
one, most Ghanaians, particularly outside of urban centers, do not speak English, which is 
the primary broadcast language.382 
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Moreover, the rural-urban divide erects significant hurdles to establishing and 
sustaining broadcasting networks throughout much of the country. With 52.2 percent of 
Ghanaians living in rural areas, these hurdles affect the majority of Ghanaians.383 One 
reason for limited broadcasting viability in rural regions is that private radio stations are 
dependent on advertising revenue, but most advertisers target the urban centers of Greater 
Accra, Kumasi, and Tema.384 In 2002, ten years after the broadcast sector was liberalized, 
four of the nation’s ten regions had two or fewer on-air private radio stations.385 These 
disparities in broadcast coverage remain largely unchanged today.386 Community radio is 
an important tool for addressing these obstacles and for protecting rural populations’ right 
to communicate. However, legal hurdles to the successful dissemination of community 
radio remain entrenched.  
2. Lack of a Clear National Regulatory & Policy Framework 
The current regulatory regime is primarily a result of historical happenstance rather 
than considered legislative or constitutional judgment.387 Broadcasting is regulated by two 
agencies whose authority seems to conflict—the National Media Commission (NMC), an 
independent constitutional body tasked with the appointment of state-owned media 
management and regulation of broadcasting content, and the National Communication 
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Authority (NCA), a state agency overseen by the executive that has authority over 
frequency allocation but does not regulate content.388 
Unlike the independent press, “independent broadcasting was born in controversy, 
litigation and political tension.”389 After the 1992 Constitution created the NMC, the 
military regime, unhappy with the NMC’s authority to appoint the management of state-
owned media institutions, created the Frequency Registration and Control Board (FRCB) to 
handle media appointments.390 The FRCB managed the transition from a single-media state 
to democratic governance and was given the authority to assign broadcast frequencies. The 
Supreme Court eventually upheld the NMC’s right to appoint state-owned media 
management, but the FRCB retained authority to allocate frequencies.391 With the passage 
of the National Communication Authority Act in 1996, the FRCB became the NCA, which 
absorbed the FRCB and its functions.392 In short, the NCA is an agency born out of 
government opposition to the NMC’s mandate.393 
Today, both the NMC and NCA exercise control over the broadcasting sector, but 
there is no formal legal framework for their interaction or cooperation.394 As Professor 
Audrey Gadzekpo bemoans, “more than 14 years since independent broadcasting became 
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owned broadcasters, without any clear national regulatory and policy framework.”).  
88 
 
an integral and vital part of the social and political environment, Ghana lacks a 
comprehensive broadcasting law that sets out clearly the legal framework to regulate this 
important resource.”395 This is not for a want of plausible comprehensive proposals, which 
can be traced back to at least 1993.396 
Under the status quo, the NCA authorizes and assigns radio frequencies, while the 
NMC creates content standards for broadcasters and monitors the performance of the 
sector.397 Though the NMC nominally regulates broadcast content, it has no legal authority 
to issue fines or sanctions or to terminate frequency authorizations.398 According to many 
in the sector, the majority of content problems within broadcasting are related to 
professionalism.399 Without enforcement power over professionalism standards, the trend 
of “media practitioners . . . refus[ing] to co-operate with institutions such as the National 
Media Commission set up to protect and regulate them”400 will continue unchecked. Yet the 
NMC has no means of enforcing professional standards. Currently, it is merely a hortatory 
body whose directives can be ignored by broadcasters with impunity.401 The NCA, on the 
other hand, is a powerful regulatory authority that has nearly unchecked discretion in its 
                                                             
395 GADZEKPO, supra note 120, at 13. She goes on to note that this absence creates “a lack of clarity on the 
fundamental principles and objectives of broadcasting and responsibilities of broadcasters” that allows the 
broadcasting sphere to be “inundated by unprofessional conduct.” Id. 
396 See generally KARIKARI, supra note 328. Heath traces much of the history of debates over broadcast 
regulation from the adoption of the 1992 Constitution to 1999. See Heath, supra note 392. 
397 See GADZEKPO, supra note 120, at 16; see also Ufuoma, supra note 323, at 204 (listing the myriad problems 
with the unclear relationship and overlapping authority between the NMC and the NCA). It should be noted 
that the NCA does not solely oversee the allocation of broadcast frequencies, but all frequencies, including 
aviation. Interview with Margaret Amoakohene, supra note 393. 
398 Ufuoma, supra note 323, at 204 (recognizing that the NMC “cannot enforce professionalism on the 
airwaves . . . because, although they are mandated to monitor content, they do not have the capacity 
(frequency) to carry out this function”).  
399 Interview with George Sarpong, supra note 241; Interview with Ghana Broad. Corp., supra note 224.  
400 GADZEKPO, supra note 120, at 11.  
401 Interview with Margaret Amoakohene, supra note 393. Journalists who have been called to appear before 
the NMC have refused to appear, aware that the NMC has no means of enforcing its own directives. Id. 
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allocation of frequencies through a process lacking transparency.402 Some charge that this 
discretion results in politically unpopular voices being suppressed, though others say that 
the evidence does not confirm a political bias in frequency allocations.403 The troubling 
reality is that there is currently no mechanism in place to appeal a decision of the NCA 
denying (or failing to act on) an application for a frequency authorization.404 For example, a 
number of community radio stations have had frequency applications pending with the 
NCA for over two years with no action or explanation.405 The laws governing the NCA 
establish criteria for the issuance of broadcast frequencies, but individual applicants 
cannot compel the NCA to grant an application upon satisfaction of these criteria. 
Combined with the fact that the NCA “lacks autonomy from the Executive because most 
members of its board, including the chairman, are appointed by government,”406 this 
unreviewable authority is particularly worrisome. A widely followed private radio station, 
Oman FM, has experienced unexplained, long-term jamming and transmission interference 
over the past few months, which it attributes to the NCA.407 These incidents illustrate the 
unworkability of the current NCA regulatory regime. 
                                                             
402 Interview with George Sarpong, supra note 241.  
403 Id.  
404 Id. 
405 Interview with Wilna Quarmyne, supra note 28.  
406 GADZEKPO, supra note 120, at 16. 
407 Interview with representatives from Daily Guide, supra note 222; see also Avle, supra note 118, at 8, Oman 
FM Writes to NCA Again, DAILY GUIDE, Feb. 15, 2013, available at 
http://www.modernghana.com/news/445737/1/oman-fm-writes-to-nca-again.html; Oman FM Protests 
Jamming, VIBEGHANA, Dec. 2012, available at http://vibeghana.com/2012/12/13/oman-fm-protests-
jamming/. 
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While the NCA has authority to review applications and assign broadcast 
frequencies, it does not have any authority over content, and thus does not revoke licenses 
when content standards are violated. The conflicting roles of the two agencies and their 
collective inability to monitor broadcast content has prompted some to point out that “you 
can’t divorce content from technology,”408 because “frequency acts as the platform on 
which content is carried.”409 
                                                             
408 Interview with Wilna Quarmyne, supra note 28. 
409 Ufuoma, supra note 323, at 204. 
Radio’s Role in the 2008 Elections 
     Before the Electoral Commission announced the official results of the December 2008 presidential elections, Accra radio 
station Joy FM announced that the new president would be John Atta Mills, the NDC Candidate, even though all of the run-
off votes had not yet been counted. NDC supporters celebrated on the streets, while the governing NPP declared that this 
announcement was “highly speculative and premature.” Other radio stations soon joined—either inciting listeners or praising 
Joy’s declaration.  At the time, GBC polls showed the NPP candidate Nana Akufo-Addo slightly ahead. 
     Many felt that Joy’s actions embodied irresponsible journalism—the type of sensationalist coverage designed to stir up 
public sentiment rather than carefully report facts.  The NMC was unable to take any action to restrain the stations, and 
the NCA claimed that it had no authority to regulate the content of the broadcasts. From Joy’s perspective, however, this 
is exactly what American networks do on the first Tuesday of November every four years—CNN, Fox News, ABC, NBC, 
and CBS all analyze complex polling data and incoming results in order to make near-certain predictions. Joy had set up a 
complex system of over 500 correspondents to collect polling and voting data from across the country, so it was very 
confident in its information.  Regardless of who is right, it is clear that radio has had and will continue to have a pivotal role 
in Ghanaian elections. 
 
Adapted from information in Seyram Avle, Global Flows, Media and Developing Democracies: The Ghanaian Case, 3 J. AFRICAN MEDIA 
STUDIES, no. 1 (2011), at 7; KATHRYN MEISSNER, FRIEDRICH EBERT FOUNDATION, ELECTIONS AND CONFLICT IN GHANA: COUNTRY 
ANALYSIS (2010), available at http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/07676.pdf; Ghana Opposition Claims Poll Win, BBC NEWS (Dec. 30, 2008, 
14:55 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7804212.stm; 2008 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections Result, MY JOY ONLINE, 
http://elections.myjoyonline.com/results_main.php?election=6.  
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This incompatibility is particularly confusing in the realm of community radio 
regulation. Because “the body (NCA) that formulated the guideline for community radio is 
different from the one (NMC) implementing the guideline, it is difficult for the regulatory 
body to regulate community radios as all they can do is work within the available 
framework (which is ambiguous).”410 Ambiguity in terms of which stations can be classified 
as community radio based on urban or rural localities, broadcast language, content, and 
ownership structure creates complex tension between the NMC and NCA. 
 Informal cooperation between the two bodies has recently emerged. Some in the 
broadcasting sector attribute good election coverage by the media in 2012, in part, to this 
                                                             
410 Ufuoma, supra note 323, at 202. 
Radio Oman 
     The Daily Guide reports that Kencity Media, an operator of several private television and radio stations, 
experienced frequent interference with its radio and television signals during the 2012 elections.1 Among other private 
stations, Kencity Media operates Oman FM, which was identified by the Media Foundation for West Africa in its 
report on electoral campaign language as the station responsible for the greatest number of indecent expressions.2 
Indecent expressions were particularly concentrated in two popular programs, National Agenda and Boiling Point.3  
     Interference with Oman FM frequencies began several months before the elections and has continued into 2013.4 
The station believes that the NCA is responsible for intentionally and illegally jamming its airwaves because the timing 
of interference evinces a “consistent and sustained effort”5 to block “particular personalities or … subject[s].”6 The 
NCA denied these allegations in a press release, stating that an investigation was conducted and concluding that the 
allegations were unfounded.7 The NCA also claimed that the type of interference alleged by Kencity Media was not 
even within its technical capacity.8 The experience of Oman FM, which remains unresolved, has led private-sector 
journalists in particular to worry that “freedom of expression and the press are, with impunity, being pushed to the 
backburners.”9 
 
1
 Oman FM Protests Jamming, DAILY GUIDE, Dec. 12, 2012, available at http://www.dailyguideghana.com/?p=70301.  
2Press Release, Media Foundation for West Africa, MFWA’s Second Quarter Findings on Monitoring Electoral Campaign Language 
on Radio (Nov. 5, 2012), available at http://www.mediafound.org/en/?p=3037. The term “indecent expressions” includes insulting 
and offensive comments, unsubstantiated allegations, comments promoting divisiveness, expressions containing tribal slurs, prejudice, 
bigotry, or gender-specific indecency, and other types of inflammatory remarks. Id.   
3Id.  
4
 See Oman FM Cries Foul: Our Radio Frequency is being Jammed, GHANA REPORTERS (Apr. 19, 2012), 
http://ghanareporters.com/2012/04/19/oman-fm-cries-foul-our-radio-frequency-is-being-jammed/; A. R. Gomda, Oman FM Writes to 
NCA Again, DAILY GUIDE, Feb. 15, 2013, available at http://www.dailyguideghana.com/?p=74614. 
5
 Gomda, supra note 4. 
6
 Gagging Our Voices, DAILY GUIDE, Feb. 7, 2013, available at http://www.dailyguideghana.com/?p=74194.  
7
 Press Release, Nat’l Comm. Authority, NCA Response – Interferance [sic] with NET2 TV signals (Dec. 11, 2012), 
http://www.nca.org.gh/73/34/News.html?item=285.  
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informal cooperation.411 While this trend is positive, it points once again to the lack of any 
formal mechanism for cooperation between the two agencies that would ensure the two 
bodies work together to monitor content and to allocate frequencies in a consistently fair 
and transparent manner. 
3. Inequitable Frequency Allocation 
 
Access to the airwaves is provided through the allocation of frequencies, a limited 
public good. It is incumbent upon allocating authorities to establish open and participatory 
means for equitably distributing frequencies. The 2001 African Charter on Broadcasting 
(the “Charter”) states that frequencies should be equitably distributed among the three 
broadcasting sectors – commercial, public and community.412 Ghanaian law adopted the 
three-tiered broadcasting structure and the mandate for equitable distribution with the 
passage of the National Media Policy in 2000 and the National Telecommunication Policy in 
2005.413 All three media sectors are tasked with “meet[ing] the information, education, and 
entertainment needs of the public and promot[ing] national identity and culture despite 
their ownership structure.”414 However, public and commercial radio stations are largely 
unable to meet these public needs due to their funding and organizational structures.415 As 
a result, community radio has become the primary medium “for the empowerment of 
                                                             
411 Interview with George Sarpong, supra note 241.  
412 Interview with Wilna Quarmyne, supra note 28; United Nations Educ., Scientific & Cultural Org., African 
Charter on Broadcasting (Windhoek Declaration) part I, 1-4, May 5, 2001, available at 
http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/files/5628/10343523830african_charter.pdf/african%2Bcharter.pd. 
413 Ufuoma, supra note 323, at 195; MINISTRY OF COMM., NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY §2.2, 2005, 
available at http://www.nca.org.gh/downloads/Ghana_Telecom_Policy_2005.pdf. 
414 Ufuoma, supra note 323, at 195. 
415 Id. 
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marginalized communities” and “has the potential of enhancing participatory democracy 
and bridging the information gap.”416 
Community radio has become the principal news medium available to the 52.2 
percent of Ghanaians who live in rural areas; it helps bridge “the digital divide between the 
‘information haves’ and ‘information haves not [sic].’”417 In the context of the national 
inequalities noted above, the community radio movement seeks to vindicate the rights of 
rural and marginalized populations to receive information and to communicate.418 
                                                             
416 Id. 
417 Id.  
418 Interview with Wilna Quarmyne, supra note 28. The right to communicate encompasses not only an 
individual’s right to express herself and her opinions, but also one’s right to have her opinions taken into 
account. “Community radio plays an indispensible role in media because it responds to the needs of the 
community.” Interview with Ghana Broad. Corp., supra note 224.  
Radio Ada 
Established in 1998 by Alex and Wilna Quarmyne, Radio Ada is Ghana’s premier community radio station 
and the first member of the Ghana Community Radio Network. The radio station’s facilities were donated by the 
couple, and are located in Big Ada in Mr. Quarmyne’s native Dangme Region. 
Radio Ada is staffed almost entirely by volunteers, yet the station is on air 17 hours per day and boasts an 
array of programs on topics ranging from local environmental issues, to news reviews, to youth shows with youth 
broadcasters, to call in shows, and programs on gender equality. Radio Ada’s broadcast range reaches about 600,000 
people, many of whom are illiterate.1 The station engages these listeners by broadcasting in their native Dangme 
language.  
Building upon the definition found in the 2001 African Charter on Broadcasting, Radio Ada’s founders 
define community broadcasting as “broadcasting which is for, by, about, and of a specific marginalized community, 
whose ownership and management is representative of the community, which pursues a participatory social 
development agenda and which is non-profit, non-sectarian, and non-partisan.” Firm believers that “the least voiced 
have the greatest right to communicate”, the Quarmynes and other community advocates see community radio as a 
means of empowerment that gives a voice to the voiceless by providing a forum where they can express their opinions 
and have those opinions heard.2 
 
1
 White, George. “Community Radio in Ghana: The Power of Engagement,” UCLA Center for Communications & 
Community, C3 Online, 2007. http://www.c3.ucla.edu/research-reports/reports-archive/editors-perspective/community-
radio-in-ghana; Quarmyne, Wilna. A “Kente” Approach to Community Radio Training: Weaving Training into the 
Community Empowerment Process,” The First International Workshop on Farm Radio Broadcasting, Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Corporate Document Repository, 2001. 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/x6721e/x6721e30.htm. 
2
 Interview with Wilna Quarmyne, March 11, 2013. 
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Unlike most public and commercial stations, community radio stations broadcast in 
rural and remote communities, primarily in local languages. Community radio 
programming, determined by community members, attempts to address needs and issues 
specific to the targeted communities. In many communities served by community radio 
stations, the stations are the primary source of news and information from the rest of the 
country.419 
Despite legislation calling for equitable distribution of frequencies among the three 
broadcasting sectors, community radio stations in Ghana continue to struggle to obtain a 
fair distribution of frequencies. The Ghana Community Radio Network (GCRN), founded in 
1999, seeks to cover all ten regions of Ghana with community radio stations, particularly in 
resource-rich areas of the country where vulnerable communities tend to be excluded from 
discussions over resource use and distribution.420 However, only eight of Ghana’s ten 
regions currently have community radio stations.421 
Community radio stations have historically faced significant regulatory and political 
obstacles to their establishment and operation. When broadcasting was first liberalized in 
Ghana, all frequencies were distributed to commercial broadcasters.422 In 2005, the 
National Telecommunications Policy stated that any community radio station with a 
pending frequency application with the NCA should receive an expedited review of its 
application and obtain a frequency within six months.423 Before the 2005 act, broadcasting 
                                                             
419 Interview with Wilna Quarmyne, supra note 28. 
420 Id.  
421 Id.  
422 Id. 
423 Ministry of Comm., National Telecommunications Policy § 2.3.  
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guidelines for community radio significantly restricted their reach.424 For example, 
community radio stations were prohibited from broadcasting any political information, 
including the names of political officials.425 Additionally, community radio stations could 
not earn any revenue and had to limit their coverage to a five-kilometer radius.426 NCA 
guidelines have since been recast to adopt the GCRN’s definition of community radio and to 
allow community radio stations to generate revenue.427 However, the updated guidelines 
retain the five-kilometer transmission restriction.428 The transmission restriction, if 
enforced, would render all community radio stations ineffective and unable to reach their 
target communities.429 It would require the nation’s most well-known and well-regarded 
community radio station, Radio Ada, to shut down.430 
The NCA’s community radio guidelines are not currently enforced. Thirty-seven of 
the currently designated community radio stations do not meet the definition enshrined in 
the guidelines. Despite the directive to grant community radio station applications within 
six months, many applications have been pending for years, while commercial station 
applications in rural regions receive prompt approval.431 Inequitable distribution has been 
exacerbated in part by confusion over the definition of community radio stations. Under 
the status quo, most rural stations are categorized as community radio stations and urban 
                                                             
424 Interview with Wilna Quarmyne, supra note 28.  
425 Id.  
426 Id.  
427 Interview with Wilna Quarmyne, supra note 28; Ufuoma, supra note 323, at 201. 
428 Interview with Wilna Quarmyne, supra note 28; Ufuoma, supra note 323, at 201. 
429 Radio Ada currently broadcasts to a range of about 50 miles and reaches over 600,000 people in about 150 
towns and villages. Interview with Isaac Djagbletey, Station Coordinator, Radio Ada, in Ada, Ghana (Mar. 16, 
2013). See also, George White, Community Radio in Ghana: The Power of Engagement, UCLA Center for 
Communications and Community (2007), http://www.c3.ucla.edu/research-reports/reports-
archive/editors-perspective/community-radio-in-ghana. 
430 Interview with Wilna Quarmyne, supra note 28; Interview with Isaac Djagbletey, supra note 429. 
431 Interview with Wilna Quarmyne, supra note 28. 
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stations are commercial, regardless of the communities they serve.432 Similar confusion 
exists regarding stations that broadcast in local languages, which are widely classified as 
community radio stations regardless of broadcast content.433 This classification is 
particularly inaccurate in the wake of the 2009 Guidelines for Local Language Broadcasting 
(“2009 Guidelines”), after which most radio stations broadcast in local languages.434 The 
confusion makes it difficult for the NMC to effectively regulate community radio435 and 
causes broadcasters to complain about a lack of transparency in the frequency distribution 
process.436 
Inequitable frequency distribution remains a problem today. There are currently 
247 authorized commercial stations, run by thirty-seven commercial broadcasters;437 
twelve on-air community radio stations, with eleven stations pending approval by the 
NCA;438 and eleven public FM stations, in addition to the national GBC station.439 
4. Structural Obstacles 
 
a. Media Consolidation and Foreign Ownership 
  
A serious threat to the right to impart information in modern Ghana is media 
consolidation among a few corporate owners. For example, the Multimedia Company 
dominates the independent radio sector and presents a risk of monopolization of the 
                                                             
432 Ufuoma, supra note 323, at 199. 
433 Id. at 201. 
434 Id. at 202. 
435 Id. at 199. 
436 Interview with Wilna Quarmyne, supra note 28. 
437 Id.  
438 These 12 stations are those that meet the GCRN’s “community radio” definition, which narrower than the 
NCA’s definition. The GCRN definition is “broadcasting which is for, by, about, and of a specific marginalized 
community whose ownership and management is representative of the community, which pursues a 
participatory social development agenda and which is non-profit, non-sectarian, and non-partisan.” Id. The 11 
stations awaiting a frequency have had applications pending for over two years. Id. 
439 Interview with Ghana Broad. Corp., supra note 224. 
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airwaves.440 Some believe that the main threat to media freedom in Ghana no longer comes 
from government but from private media and media owners who dictate messages and can 
hire and fire at will.441 
 Similarly, the prospect of foreign ownership of media outlets is currently the source 
of much debate in Ghana. On the one hand, some fear that foreign ownership and control of 
media messages and content threatens Ghana’s cultural autonomy. Others believe that 
foreign investment is necessary to develop Ghanaian media outlets and improve media 
quality.442 
b. Convergence  
 
 Increasing digital convergence of broadcast frequencies raises new issues and 
obstacles for regulators. In the past, the limits of pre-compression technology sharply 
restricted the number of stations that could transmit over the airwaves. Today, as digital 
convergence increasingly becomes the norm, a new obstacle is emerging: transmission 
companies operate as bottlenecks to the ability to share information.443 Fewer 
transmission companies are now capable of controlling much more of the access to the 
airwaves and are capable of shutting down entire swathes of the media.444 This 
phenomenon is thought by some to pose one of the biggest dangers to freedom of 
expression in Ghana’s current media environment.445 
                                                             
440 The Multimedia Group owns such well-known stations as JOY FM, Adom FM, and LOVE FM. Our Brands, 
Multimedia Group Ghana (last accessed May 6, 2013), http://www.multimediaghana.com/brands.html. 
441 Interview with Ghana Broad. Corp., supra note 224. 
442 Interview with George Sarpong, supra note 241. 
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 Increased involvement in broadcasting by transmission companies also poses the 
regulatory issue of whether liability for content should lie with the content producer or the 
content transmitter (the transmission company). If liability lies with the content 
transmitter, transmission companies would assume the role of censoring content creators. 
This would require content regulators (the NMC) to legally insulate transmission 
companies from government influence and to clarify companies’ relationships with content 
creators.446 Convergence creates a power imbalance between transmission companies and 
broadcasting networks that risks echoing Ghana’s history of government control of the 
airwaves, but with a corporate twist.  
5. Extra-legal and cultural obstacles 
 
Many stakeholders feel that the lack of training required to practice journalism 
hinders professionalism, which in turn hinders the production of high-quality broadcasting. 
According to the current Executive Secretary of the NMC, 95 percent of problems with the 
media can only be addressed through training.447 In an era of burgeoning private 
broadcasting, the “problem is how to marry freedom with responsibility.”448 For example, 
some broadcasters with no journalistic experience are hired based on the appeal of their 
voices.449 Moreover, many radio anchors on non-English stations lack formal education and 
go on air without preparing a written program beforehand.450 It is common for 
newscasters on many daily radio shows to simply summarize the news headlines or 
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448 Interview with Ghana Broad. Corp., supra note 224. 
449 Interview with Wilna Quarmyne, supra note 28. 
450 Interview with Margaret Amoakohene, supra note 393. 
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important articles from major newspapers, or read them aloud to their audiences.451 Many 
politicians denounce private journalists as unprofessional sensationalists who promote 
defamatory rumors for the sake of attracting more listeners.452 
In the absence of enforceable professionalism regulations, some broadcast networks 
develop their own trainings and guidelines. Prior to the 2012 election, the GRCN and its 
membership established a community code of radio conduct as well as a “people’s 
manifesto” outlining party platforms, parliamentary candidate “scorecards” listing criteria 
for evaluating candidates, and a requirement that member stations give political parties 
equal air time.453 
The GJA and the NMC have created ethical guidelines for the private media, but 
complain that “the level of respect for these guidelines is zero” because private media 
ignores important issues in favor of sensationalized stories.454 Because the law does not 
currently permit punitive measures or sanctions, the only enforcement remedy the NMC 
and the GJA’s ethics and disciplinary authority has is “naming and shaming.”455 
Among the other informal obstacles to extensive media freedom is the residual self-
censorship caused by the post-colonial decades of government oppression and control. 
This leads to a “culture of silence”456 in which journalists refrain from reporting stories that 
are politically damaging to those in power or that might be embarrassing to the ruling 
elites. The ensuing neglect leaves citizens uninformed about some of the most 
                                                             
451 Cf. Temin & Smith, supra note 46, at 596 (noting that the media “still lack in-depth examination of the 
events they report”). 
452 E.g., Prez Mahama Is Right: Stop the “Lazy” Morning Shows on Radio, PEACE FM ONLINE (Mar. 26, 2013), 
http://elections.peacefmonline.com/politics/201303/159455.php. 
453 Interview with Wilna Quarmyne, supra note 28. 
454 Interview with Ghana Broad. Corp., supra note 224. 
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consequential political events affecting government operations.457 Like several of the other 
obstacles outlined here, the culture of silence is not easily resolved though legal reforms. 
Yet the proposed solutions that follow do offer hope that most obstacles can be remedied 
by effective regulations—concerns regarding professionalism, for example, might be 
mitigated if journalists had better access to information and better ways to share it without 
resorting to sensationalism.458   
C. The Broadcast Bill: A Needed Reform 
 
  Despite general agreement on the major problems identified, several fundamental 
disagreements lie at the heart of proposed solutions. This Section focuses on the ways in 
which proposed broadcast regulations affect radio broadcasters, though these proposals 
inevitably affect television and other broadcasting. While some obstacles resist easy legal 
solutions, many of those identified—involving agency competition and competence,459 
media consolidation,460 and ideologically-motivated frequency allocation461—can be 
squarely addressed by a coherent set of broadcasting regulations. This Section specifically 
focuses on a 2007 proposal for a broadcasting bill, which would address the two main tasks 
of broadcasting regulation—technical allocation and content monitoring (including 
                                                             
457 KARIKARI, supra note 70, at 26–27 (“Pandering to a false notion that people do not like politics, private 
broadcasting stations are failing to deliver quality news and current affairs programs that offer diversity, 
pluralism and real information to people on important national issues.”) 
458 Interview with E. Kwasi Bandua, supra note 202. 
459 This is a constant source of contention, where “[a]dvocates of media pluralism have argued that, in 
accordance with the Constitution, the NMC has the responsibility for administering broadcast frequencies; 
however the government has maintained that responsibility for administering all radio frequencies properly 
lies with a state administrative body.” Heath, supra note 392, at 513. 
460 KARIKARI, supra note 70, at 27 (“The independent radio sector is dominated by the Multimedia Company, 
owners of JOY FM.”). 
461 Interview with Wilna Quarmyne, supra note 28.  
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structural regulation).462 After analyzing the proposal, the Section highlights the ways in 
which each addresses or fails to address the obstacles identified.463 
1. The 2007 Broadcasting Bill Proposal 
 The 2007 Broadcasting Bill Proposal presents several possible answers to the 
problems of regulating a quickly expanding broadcast medium.464 Though the proposal is 
slightly outdated and may no longer represent a live legislative option, it is important for 
several reasons. First, it is one of the few proposals (and the first one of which the authors 
of this Report are aware) to lay out in comprehensive detail the mode and manner of 
broadcasting regulation. This level of detail allows the kind of analysis that is impossible 
with threadbare outlines and incomplete regulatory aspirations. Second, through its 
specificity, the proposal addresses the issues at the heart of the debate and thereby enables 
assessment of whether the proposed solutions adequately address the obstacles identified. 
These two reasons undergird the in-depth analysis that follows. This Section analyzes the 
Bill and evaluates its effectiveness in addressing important obstacles.    
a. The Proposal’s Regulatory Framework 
 
 The proposal in many ways formalizes existing regulatory practices, but also moves 
further to integrate and rationalize the process. For example, the proposal recognizes and 
codifies the three traditional sectors of broadcasting: public service, commercial, and 
                                                             
462 Interview with George Sarpong, supra note 241 (recognizing these as the two main tasks); see also 
KARIKARI, supra note 328, at 11 (“Essentially, two categories of the elements comprising broadcasting require 
one or another form of regulation, namely: the Radio Spectrum (frequency) and the output of Radio 
Broadcasting, that is, the content of broadcasting.”) 
463 See supra Part V.B (recognizing varying languages, inequalities across the country, limited broadcasting 
infrastructure, lack of clear framework for NCA/NMC interaction, cultural/institutional norms, media 
consolidation, and foreign investment as obstacles to the full realization of broadcaster’s freedom to share 
information).  
464 The information concerning the proposal in this section is taken from the 2007 Proposals for a 
Broadcasting Act.  
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community.465 While each sector has unique obligations, rights, and responsibilities, a 
common framework undergirds the entire system: The NMC is responsible for all 
broadcasting authorization.466 In addition, the NMC grants authorization to operate in one 
of the three sectors of broadcast, which presumably means that an authorization cannot 
permit a broadcaster to engage in both community and commercial broadcasting, for 
example, at the same time.467 The proposal further details the rights and responsibilities of 
the three sectors individually. 
 The public service sector refers to state-owned or wholly state-funded 
broadcasting.468 Broadcasters in this sector are insulated from government control or 
influence and are free to exercise independence when making editorial decisions.469 With 
this freedom comes a responsibility, however, to provide diverse, informative, and 
educational programming.470 The proposal also sets strict guidelines on the composition of 
the boards of directors. These directors are appointed by the NMC and are responsible for 
operating the public service broadcasters.471 
 Next, the proposal defines commercial broadcasters as “radio and television stations 
that are privately owned and operated for profit and controlled privately by independent 
commercial groups.”472 These broadcasters have a public interest obligation to provide 
diverse programming that highlights Ghanaian culture and identity, some of which must be 
                                                             
465 Proposal for a Broadcasting Act, 2007, 2. 
466 Id. at 4. 
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469 Id. at 7(5). 
470 Id. at 7(4). 
471 See id. at  9.  
472 Id. at 10. 
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broadcast in in local languages.473 They must also, within a reasonable time after 
authorization, “extend their services to ensure comprehensive coverage of the area for 
which they are authorised to provide services.”474 Beyond this, the formal duties of 
commercial broadcasters are left largely to later specification by the NMC.  
 In contrast to the broad definition of commercial broadcasters, community 
broadcasters are narrowly defined as “radio and television stations that are about, for, by 
and of a specific marginalized community, whose ownership and management are 
representative of the community, which pursue a participatory social development agenda, 
and which are non-profit, non-partisan and non-sectarian.”475 The proposal lists several 
requirements for community broadcasters, including that they steadfastly remain focused 
on the needs of their particular marginalized community.476 The proposal further 
empowers the NMC to issue minimum coverage requirements for programs in the local 
language and for those produced or created by the station or community.477 Moreover, 
these broadcasters cannot engage in substantial commercial advertising and must reinvest 
surplus revenue back into the venture.478 
 After establishing the rights and responsibilities of the three sectors, the proposal 
turns to regulatory authority. It provides that the NMC shall have the power to grant 
frequency authorization and terminate such authorizations.479 In this framework, the NCA’s 
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authority extends only to technical matters.480 Even after the NCA plans and assigns the 
radio frequency spectrum generally, the proposal prescribes that it “shall thereafter assign 
the frequencies for broadcasting to the [National Media] Commission.”481 Though the NCA 
may terminate an authorization in the face of immediate harm, an appeal from this 
termination lies with the NMC.482 In addition to this quasi-appellate authority, the NMC is 
tasked with implementing broadcasting standards and regulations. It is empowered to 
enforce these standards by appropriate sanctions issued by a special committee 
established in the proposal (the Broadcasting Standards and Complaint Committee).483 
Finally, the proposal mandates that a National Frequency Plan be established by the NMC 
and NCA within six months of the Bill’s passage that includes the number of available 
frequencies and plans for their distribution.484 
 The proposal also requires the NMC to develop a policy on how frequency 
authorizations will be made, and to make that policy and its accompanying procedures 
publicly available.485 Applicants who meet the listed criteria are to be granted an 
authorization, assuming that frequencies are available.486 However, the proposal also 
creates several restrictions on ownership and control. No person may be awarded more 
than three radio frequencies and one television frequency/channel;487 a foreign person 
cannot be awarded a frequency, indirectly or directly control one, or have a majority 
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financial interest in a broadcaster;488 and no political party, public official, district 
assembly, or religious body can be awarded a frequency.489 
b. Evaluating the Proposal 
 
The 2007 proposal answers many of the questions confronting the broadcasting 
sector. For example, the proposal incorporates mechanisms to ensure adequate 
programming in the local languages;490 addresses inequalities across the country by 
prescribing greater radio coverage;491 recognizes the nature of frequencies as a public good 
and plans for their equitable distribution;492 provides a clear framework for the interaction 
of the NMC and the NCA;493 empowers the NMC to establish guidelines for professional 
quality and the disciplinary tools to implement the guideline;494 limits the extent of media 
consolidation through a cap on the ownership of frequencies;495 and prohibits foreign 
ownership, control, and investment that would undermine Ghanaian independence and 
identity.496 
Though the proposal addresses most of the obstacles identified in this Report, it 
does not adequately resolve all of them. For instance, some critics fault the bill for failing to 
take into account changing technological advances, a major element in effective and 
efficient regulation moving forward. In particular, as articulated by the NMC Executive 
Secretary George Sarpong, “[w]hile the world is going convergence, the bill proposes 
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divergence.”497 Technological changes stemming from digitization require a convergence of 
broadcasting regulation. The allocation and regulation of broadcasting should not be 
distributed individually to one agency while authority over other frequencies is distributed 
to another agency. Nor should technical aspects be necessarily separated from granting an 
authorization in the first place. Progress in digital technology necessitates that one 
agency—like the Federal Communications Authority in the United States—regulate all 
communication media. The Bill heavily favors the NMC as the regulatory body in charge, 
but leaves much of the technical work to the NCA. So long as the NMC is legally empowered 
to issue sanctions for violations of broadcasting standards, the ownership and control of 
the frequencies need not be in its hands. More to the point, the proposal isolates particular 
broadcasting media, such as television and radio, and develops an independent regulatory 
framework for these media without integrating them into the whole telecommunications 
sector.  
 Additionally, other issues that are important in the midst of rapid technological 
change are unaddressed. The proposal is silent on important issues between transmission 
companies and content producers.498 This is an undeniably important component of 
broadcasting regulation in the digital era.499 Yet there is no mention of questions 
concerning the relationship between transmission companies and content producers, 
including the nature of their legal relationship, limits (if any) on transmission companies’ 
ability to screen content, and where liability for objectionable content lies. This is one more 
                                                             
497 Interview with George Sarpong, supra note 241.  
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499 Id. (recounting the problems with censorship by large transmission companies and the power imbalance 
between these companies and smaller content producers).  
107 
 
reason to think that the proposal lags behind technological progress and the changing 
landscape of broadcasting.  
 Finally, the proposal’s particular segmentation of the broadcasting sector may turn 
out to be problematic. The public service and commercial sectors are clear enough, but the 
stringent requirements and narrow definition of community broadcasting threaten to leave 
out an entire swath of broadcasters: ordinary non-profit broadcasters that may not 
exclusively serve marginalized communities, or, even if they do serve these communities, 
may not originate from them. There is no role in the proposal for non-commercially owned 
and operated private broadcasters that serve a broader audience or purpose than 
community broadcasters narrowly defined. While the narrow definition of community 
broadcasters serves a noteworthy goal, other kinds of privately owned public interest 
broadcasting ought to be cultivated as well.  
Table 4. Obstacles and Solutions in the Broadcast Bill 
Obstacles Identified Addressed? If so, how? 
Inequalities across the country Yes The proposal mandates that community broadcasters 
produce shows in the local languages, encourages 
public interest broadcasters to do so, and requires 
commercial broadcasters to comprehensively cover 
their authorized access areas  
Lack of a clear policy framework Yes The proposal gives ownership and control of 
frequencies to the NMC and empowers the NMC to 
authorize and revoke frequencies  
Inequitable frequency allocation Partially The proposal identifies equitable distribution as a 
principle guiding frequency allocation, but does not 
specify how equitable distribution is to be 
determined  
Structural Obstacles Partially The proposal is designed to limit media consolidation 
and foreign ownership, but does incorporate 
changing technological developments into its 
regulatory scheme 
Extra-Legal Cultural Obstacles No --- 
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VI. Conclusion 
Over the last six decades, broadcast and print media have played an important role 
in Ghana’s democratic development. Like the colonial rulers that preceded them, post-
independence leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah and John Rawlings recognized the power 
of open access to information and a free press. Viewing information as a government-
controlled tool for development, they stifled independent media outlets and maintained 
strict control over the state-owned press. The drafting of the 1992 Constitution and the 
dawn of the fourth republic ushered in a new age of freedom and democracy. The right to 
information, free speech, and a free media was enshrined in Article 21, and the criminal 
libel law was eventually abolished. Journalists no longer had to labor under intense fear 
and intimidation, citizens could more freely criticize their government.  
Today, Ghana can claim enormous successes, but also faces a new set of challenges. 
No longer is direct suppression of speech widespread. And yet not all Ghanaians can take 
advantage of the rights to hear and be heard. Overcoming this new set of obstacles will 
require affirmative actions by the Ghanaian government. Two pieces of legislation in 
particular—the Right to Information Bill and the Broadcasting Bill—can serve as 
cornerstones for this next stage of development. The goal of this Report is to bring together 
the wisdom and insights of a wide range of Ghanaian stakeholders in an effort to help lay 
that foundation.  
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Appendix I: Schedule and Meeting List 
 
Monday, March 11 
• The Media Foundation for West Africa 
o Mr. Kwame Karikari, Director 
• Ghana Independent Broadcasters Association 
o Mr. Gerald Ankrah, Executive Secretary 
• Ghana Journalists Association 
o Mr. Bright Blewu, President 
• Ghana Community Radio Network 
o Ms. Wilna Quarmyne, Co-Founder 
 
Tuesday, March 12 
• Daily Graphic 
o Mr. Yaw Boadu-Ayeboafoh, General Manager of Newspapers 
o Mr. Emmanuel Agyei Atha, Public Affairs Coordinator 
• Ghana Broadcasting Company (GBC) 
o Mr. K. Monney, Director of Radio 
• Daily Guide 
o Mr. Freddie Blay, Chairman, Daily Guide 
o Ms. Gina Ama Blay, C.E.O. of the Western Publications, Ltd. 
o Other Editors and Reporters of Daily Guide 
 
Wednesday, March 13 
• University of Ghana 
o Dr. Margaret Amoakohene, Director, School of Communications 
o Ms. Audrey Gadzekpo, Senior Lecturer, School of Communications 
• GIMPA Law School 
o Mr. Ernest Abotsi, Dean and Professor of Law 
o Kwaku Agyeman Budu, Lecturer of Law 
 
Thursday, March 14 
• Parliament 
o The Honorable Mr. E. Kwasi Bandua, MP, Biakoye, Volta Region 
o The Honorable Mr. Alhassan Mumuni, MP, Slaga North, Northern Region 
o Mr. Ebenezer Djietror, Principal Assistant Clerk to Parliament 
• National Media Commission 
o Mr. George Sarpong, Executive Secretary 
 
Friday, March 15 
• Ghana Bar Association 
o Mr. Nene Amegatcher, President 
• Ghana School of Law 
o Administrative Officials and Faculty 
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Saturday, March 16 
• Radio Ada 
o Mr. Isaac Djagbletey, Station Coordinator 
• Dogo 
o Assemblyman and Village Elders 
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Appendix III: Comparison of Right to Information Statutes
500 
 South Africa Zimbabwe United Kingdom India 
Date of enacting 
legislation 
2001 
 
2002 2000 2005 
Coverage Government bodies 
and private bodies 
where information 
is necessary for the 
exercise or 
protection of 
individual rights 
-Government bodies 
-Members of the 
media must be 
registered with the 
government to 
access information 
Over 10,000 public 
bodies 
Government bodies 
at national, state, 
and local level and 
private bodies 
substantially 
funded by the 
government  
Exemptions -11 subject-based 
categories 
-All exemptions 
subject to public 
interest override 
-8 subject-based 
categories 
-Press can be 
prosecuted for 
“abuse of free 
expression”  
3 categories based 
on scope of 
exemption: 
Absolute, qualified, 
and limited 
exemption  
-14 subject-based 
categories 
-All exemptions 
subject to public 
interest override 
Fees? Yes  Yes No fee if production 
cost is less than 
£600 for central 
government body 
and £450 for local 
government body 
Yes 
Time frame Government agency 
must respond in 30 
days 
Government agency 
must respond in 30 
days 
Public body must 
respond within 20 
days 
Public body must 
respond within 30 
days 
Appeals  -First review: 
Cabinet minister 
-Appeal: Court 
system 
-First review: 
Government body 
-Appeal: Media and 
Information 
Commission 
-Second appeal: 
Administrative 
court 
-First review: 
Public body 
-Appeal: 
Information 
Commissioner 
-Second appeal: 
Information 
Tribunal  
-Third Appeal: 
High Court of 
Justice 
-First review: 
Public body 
-Appeal: Senior 
public interest 
officer (additional 
internal review) 
-Second appeal: 
Information 
Commission 
Enforcement South African 
Human Rights 
Commission  
Media and 
Information 
Commission  
Information 
Commissioner 
Information 
Commission 
Miscellaneous -Criminal fines for 
those who destroy 
records 
-Government bodies 
must publish access 
guides providing 
contact information 
-Widely criticized 
as an instrument of 
speech suppression 
and media control 
-Almost no citizen 
right of access in 
practice 
-Some categories of 
information 
automatically 
released 
-All public bodies 
have access guides 
providing contact 
information 
-Fines for refusing, 
obstructing, or 
delaying access to 
requested 
information 
-Highly 
decentralized; 
states have most 
power 
                                                             
500 See generally Banisar, supra note 162. 
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